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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1957, the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale,
California, bought 21 acres of land in a canyon on the banks of the Middle
Fork of Mill Creek in the Angeles National Forest.' The creek is the natural
drainage channel for a watershed area owned by the National Forest Service.2
1. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S.
Ct. 2378, 2381 (1987).
2. Id.
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The church used the property to build Lutherglen, a camp used as a retreat
center and recreation area for handicapped children.3
In 1977, a forest fire burned the hills upstream from Lutherglen, destroy-
ing approximately 3860 acres of watershed and thereby creating a flood haz-
ard.' Less than one year later, a severe rainstorm dumped eleven inches of rain
on the area, causing a flood which destroyed the buildings at Lutherglen.5
Nearly a year after the flood, in early 1979, Los Angeles County adopted
an interim ordinance forbidding construction or reconstruction of any build-
ings in an interim flood protection area described by the ordinance, which in-
cluded Lutherglen.6 Because the county felt the ordinance was necessary for
"preservation of the public health and safety," the ordinance was made effec-
tive immediately.7
About one month after adoption of the ordinance, the church sued the
county in a California state court.8 The suit claimed, among other allegations,
that the ordinance had deprived the church of all use of its property.9 The
complaint sought damages for the loss of the use of Lutherglen. 10
The defendants moved to strike the portions of the complaint alleging
that the regulation had denied the church all use of its property." They ar-
gued that the California Supreme Court previously had held12 that a compen-
sation remedy is never available to a landowner who asserts that a regulation
has in effect taken his property. Therefore, they asserted, the allegations con-
cerning denial of use of Lutherglen were irrelevant. s
The trial court agreed that the California had established the unavailabil-
ity of a compensation remedy.14 It granted the motion, and struck all portions
of the church's complaint related to a request for damages.15
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals agreed that a compensation
remedy was not available, and upheld dismissal of the damages claim.16 The
California Supreme Court denied review, and the church appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to an-
swer whether compensation is the constitutionally required remedy when a
3. Id. The camp consisted of several buildings and a footbridge across the creek.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2381-82.
7. Id.




12. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979) [hereinafter Agins I].
13. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2382.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2382-83.
17. Id. at 2383.
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regulation deprives a property owner of the use of his property.,, That issue
was universally regarded as the most controversial constitutional question af-
fecting land use.19 The Court had tried and failed to answer the question in a
series of four cases during the 1980's, and had been severely criticized for its
failure to do so.2 0 Its ruling in First English was eagerly awaited.21
The United States Supreme Court in First English declared that when a
regulation deprives a property owner of all of his property, the Constitution
requires a compensation remedy.2 2 It held that even where the courts eventu-
ally invalidate the regulation, compensation is required for the period during
which the regulation was effective.2 3 This requirement had been implicit in
Supreme Court opinions dating back to the 1920's,24 but had never been made
incontrovertible by an explicit majority holding.2 5
The Court's ruling in First English was generally reported as a tilt to-
ward property owners and away from government regulation of land use.26
Many observers predicted that the case would have widespread effects on land
use regulation.2 7 Indeed, the dissent by Justice Stevens predicted that the deci-
sion was certain to "generate a great deal of litigation," and to have a "signifi-
cant adverse impact on the land-use regulatory process.128
18. Id.
19. See infra note 32.
20. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Deutsch, Recent Cases, Legislation, and Literature in Land Use,
Planning, Environmental Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZON-
ING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 1.02(1)(b) (1987); Taking or Regulating?: Key Land Use
Questions Before the Supreme Court, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 22.
22. First English, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987).
23. Id. at 2389 n.10.
24. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
25. See infra notes 176-95 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., National Law Journal, June 22, 1987, at 5, col. 1 ("tilted the scales
toward property owners and away from government regulation"); Chicago Tribune,
June 10, 1987, at 1, col. 2 ("a victory for the building and real estate industries and a
serious setback for state and local governments, environmental groups and conserva-
tionists"); Los Angeles Times, June 10, 1987, at 8, col. I (likely to "force a reevalua-
tion of government actions in such areas as coastal management, flood plain restriction,
open space development and the common practice of requiring real estate developers to
donate land for parks or other public uses"); Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1987, at 2,
col. 2 ("hailed by developers" but "a heavy blow to state and local land use planners").
27. See, e.g., Washington Post, June 10, 1987, at 1, col. 1 (Lee Buck, General
Counsel of the National Association of Counties quoted as saying: "This will upset the
entire balance over land use control developed over the last 75 years.").
28. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Los Angeles, 107 S.
Ct. 2378, 2389-90 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1988]
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II. THE BACKGROUND
A. "Taking" and "Just Compensation"
The constitutional issue in First English was the interpretation and effect
of the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment in the context of land
use regulation. The just compensation clause provides: "Nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation. '29 The key terms
in the clause around which controversy has swirled in recent decades are
"taken" and "just compensation." The meaning and application of these terms
and of the clause as a whole in a regulatory context is generally referred to as
the "takings issue."30
Dispute over the takings issue has centered on two interrelated questions:
Can the effect of a land use regulation amount to a "taking," and, if so, is
"just compensation" the required remedy?31 The controversy over these ques-
tions is one of the hottest in land use or constitutional law today.32
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V. It has long been settled that the just compensation
clause is applicable to the states by incorporation into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
Also, "all but three state constitutions expressly prohibit the taking of private property
for public use without just compensation, and the other three [Kansas, North Carolina,
and Virginia] have been construed to impose the same prohibition, although they do
not do so expressly." R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY § 9.1 (1984) [hereinafter THE LAW OF PROPERTY].
30. See, e.g., F. BOSSELMAN. D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1973)
[hereinafter THE TAKINGS ISSUE]; Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem,
49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165 (1974).
31. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.12, at
406 n.34 (3d ed. 1986) ("The questions that are undecided are: (1) what type of stan-
dard should be employed to determine if a regulatory diminishment in the economic
value of property is so great that it should constitute a taking and (2) whether the
government must pay for temporary, though severe, diminishments in value through
regulation."); see also Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the
Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15
RUTGERS L.J. 15, 16 (1983).
32. THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 29, § 9.1 ("[W]hether, and if so when,
governmental regulations that diminish a landowner's use and enjoyment of land can
amount to a defacto taking of property ... is perhaps the most burning legal question
that today surrounds the growing number of land-use regulations."); Bauman, supra
note 31, at 70 (the constitutionality of inverse condemnation actions in regulatory tak-
ings cases is "the most incitive issue in American land use law today"); Mandelker,
Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981)
("No constitutional problem has proved more contentious in land use regulation than
the taking issue.").
One of the rare points of agreement among all parties to the debate is that takings
law is one of the most incoherent and difficult areas in American jurisprudence. Schol-
ars have described it as "a chaos of confused argument," B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1977), a "trackless waste," N. WILLIAMS, AMER-
ICAN LAND PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 5.05(a) (1974 &
4
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The debate has generated a "flood of scholarly commentary" on the issues
involved. 33 One article on the subject found that many authors attempt to an-
Supp. 1985), a "great Serbonian bog where armies whole have sunk," Cabaniss, In-
verse Condemnation in Texas - Exploring the Serbonian Bog, 44 TEx. L. REV. 1584
n.1 (1966), and a "welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results," Sax, Tak-
ings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964). Case law on the takings issue is
reported to be "liberally salted with paradox," Michelman, Property, Utility and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1967), and filled with "conclusionary terminology, circular reason-
ing, and empty rhetoric," Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The
Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1970). The search
for a coherent takings doctrine has been compared to "the physicist's hunt for the
quark," C. HARR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d ed. 1976), and the general view is that
"there is no clear and consistent constitutional interpretation or doctrinal base underly-
ing this area of law," Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availa-
bility of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 711, 724 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Just Compensation]. In the view of legal
scholars, this state of affairs is certain to continue "unless and until the United States
Supreme Court resolves the existing confusion." THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note
29, § 9.2.
33. Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on "The White River Junction Manifesto". A
Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of
Property, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 685, 692 (1986). For a selection of major treatments of
the subject in recent years, see ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 8 (1977); R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN (1985); D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS:
LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978); MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND
EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE (1981); THE TAKINGS ISSUE, supra note 30;
Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Damages - A New Cause of Action, 5 URB.
LAW. 25 (1973); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, supra note 30;
Berger, To Regulate, Or Not To Regulate - Is That the Question? Reflections on the
Supposed Dilemma Between Environmental Protection and Private Property Rights, 8
LoY. L.A.L. REV. 253 (1975); Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569 (1984); Damich, Does 14 = 5? Overregula-
tion and Compensable Taking, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 701 (1980); Clark & Kidman,
The Relationship of Just Compensation to Land Use Regulatory Power; An Analysis
and Proposal, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 79 (1974); Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equa-
tion Making the Whole Equal the Sum of Its Parts, 15 URB. LAW. 447 (1983), re-
printed in 15 LAND USE & ENV'T L. REV. 91 (1984); Gordon, Compensable Regula-
tory Taking: A Tollbooth Rises on Regulation Road, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 211 (1983);
Greenbaum, Zoning, Taking, and Inverse Condemnation, 1981 ZONING AND PLAN-
NING LAW HANDBOOK 259 (F. Strom ed. 1981); Hagman, Temporary or Interim
Damages Awards in Land Use Control Cases, 4 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 129 (1981);
Harris, Environmental Regulations, Zoning, and Withheld Municipal Services: Tak-
ings of Property by Multi-Government Action, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 635 (1973); John-
son, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use Regulations, 15 GA. L. REV. 559 (1981);
Kanner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainty, 1980 PROCEED-
INGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN 177; Kras-
nowiecki & Strong, Compensable Regulations for Open Space: A Means of Control-
ling Urban Growth, 29 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 87 (1963); Krier, The Regulation
Machine, 1 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1982); Leeson & Sullivan, Property, Philosophy
and Regulation The Case Against a Natural Law Theory of Property Rights, 17
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 527 (1981); Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is
19881
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swer "this highly charged question from an essentially political or ideological
stance," and therefore produce predictable if legalistically-reasoned re-
sponses.3 Much of the scholarly literature illustrates a resulting "polarization
between legitimate environmental and developmental concerns," and indulges
in "artificial manipulation of the Constitution in order to justify preconceived
notions of invariable truth."3 5 Such efforts to put either a pro-regulation or
pro-development "spin" on takings law may have been motivated in large part
by the potential consequences of a compensation remedy.3 6 Obviously, the
stakes for all parties are significantly increased if money might have to be paid
when a regulation in effect "takes" property.
As a practical matter, dispute over a compensation remedy for regulatory
takings is of relatively recent origin. One treatise on property law reports that
"until quite recently, the remedy sought by landowners who challenged land
There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1987); Mandelker, Land Use
Takings: The Compensation Issue, supra note 32; McNamara, Inverse Condemnation:
A "Sophistic Miltonian Serbonian Bog," 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 443 (1979); Meyer &
Dolle, Changing Compensation Rules for Property Takings, 11 REAL EST. REV. 28
(1981); Michelman, Mr. Justice Brennan A Property Teacher's Appreciation, 15
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 296 (1980); Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right,
38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165, 1170 (1967); Morgan & Shonkwiler, Regulatory Takings in Oregon: A
Walk Down Fifth Avenue Without Due Process, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 591 (1980);
Netherton, Implementation of Land Use Policy: Police Power vs. Eminent Domain, 3
LAND & WATER L. REV. 33 (1968); Pilon, Property Rights, Takings, and a Free Soci-
ety, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 165 (1983); Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Tak-
ings Jurisprudence, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 372 (1986); Sallet, Regulatory "Tak-
ings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme Court's Search for a Solution Continues,
18 URB. LAW. 635 (1986); Sallet, The Problem of Municipal Liability for Zoning and
Land-Use Regulation, 31 CArH. U.L. REV. 465 (1982); Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964); Sax, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE
L.J. 149 (1971); Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability
of a Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
711, 724 (1982) [hereinafter Comment, Just Compensation]; Comment, "Takings"
Under the Police Power - The Development of Inverse Condemnation as a Method of
Challenging Zoning Ordinances, 30 Sw. L.J. 723 (1976); Comment, Testing the Con-
stitutional Validity of Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due Process as a Superior
Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 715 (1982); Note, Inverse Con-
demnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1439 (1974); Note, Inverse Condemnation: The Case for Diminution in
Property Value as Compensable Damage, 28 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1976).
34. Bauman, supra note 31, at 16-17.
35. Bauman, supra note 31, at 17.
36. This "spin" effort can be seen in many of the sources cited supra note 33.
For a parallel presentation of the two sides of the argument, compare Williams, Smith,
Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock, The White River Junction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV,
193 (1984) [hereinafter The White River Junction Manifesto], with Berger & Kanner,
Thoughts on "The White River Junction Manifesto". A Reply to the "Gang of Five's"
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use regulations as amounting to a de facto 'taking' was simply the invalidation
of the regulations.13 7 Prior to the 1970s, "no inverse condemnation cases were
brought in the United States on the basis of mere regulation of land."38 In the
mid-1970s, however, landowners began to bring inverse condemnation ac-
tions3" to challenge land use regulations, seeking monetary damages when reg-
ulations in effect took their property.' 0
A major reason for the rise to prominence of the compensation question
seems to have been the changed nature of regulatory practice. What has been
called the environmental revolution of the 1970s triggered a quantitative and
qualitative upsurge in land use regulation.'4 When this increase began, the
courts regarded land use regulation as primarily a matter for local control and
generally took a "hands off" approach, preferring to leave the field to legisla-
tive supervision.42 Even critics of land use regulation concede that the environ-
37. THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 29, § 9.2, at 525. The authors note that
this was true in all the leading cases in the field prior to the 1970's. Id., § 9.2, at 525
n.45.
38. D. HAGMAN & D. MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTs: LAND VALUE
CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 272 (1978).
39. Inverse condemnation is "a cause of action against a governmental defendant
to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental
defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been
attempted by the taking agency." United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)
(quoting D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
328 (1971)). "The phrase 'inverse condemnation' generally describes a cause of action
against a government defendant in which a landowner may recover just compensation
for a 'taking' of his property under the Fifth Amendment, even though formal condem-
nation proceedings in exercise of the sovereign's power of eminent domain have not
been instituted by the government entity.... In an 'inverse condemnation' action, the
condemnation is 'inverse' because it is the landowner, not the government entity, who
instituted the proceeding." San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S.
621, 638 n.2 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 29, § 9.2, at 525 ("Beginning a decade
ago [around 1974], however, the intermediate appellate courts of California began
holding that, when a landowner successfully challenged a local land use ordinance as
amounting to a de facto 'taking,' he was entitled to compensation as an alternative to
simply obtaining a declaration that the ordinance was invalid . . ").
41. Bauman, supra note 31, at 16 (the "urgent environmental revolution of the
late 1960's and the 1970's ... coupled with the parallel intensification of government
regulation, has led unavoidably to legal clashes.").
42. One scholar has suggested that the courts of the 1970's were in the third of
four periods or stages of land use control law. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLAN-
NING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER §§ 5.01-.06 (1974 & Supp. 1985)
(summarized in Bauman, supra note 31, at 74-76). According to Williams, during
stage one, "Pre-Zoning," the common law of nuisance governed land use regulation. I
N. WILLIAMS, supra, § 5.02. Beginning with stage two, "Acceptance of the Zoning
Principle," which dates from Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), the leading case on zoning, the zoning of privately-owned land was held not to
violate the fifth and fourteenth amendments. However, the burden of proof remained
on the government to show the specific harm justifying any use restriction. I N. WIL-
LIAMS, supra, § 5.03. Stage three, "Faith in Local Autonomy," was the majority rule
7
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mental revolution and many of the regulations it engendered significantly
benefitted the public.4 3 However, the combination of increased regulation and
a judicial "laissez faire" approach also brought serious negative consequences.
One such consequence was a land use regulation system aptly described
as "Balkanized." ' 4 The system confronted the landowner with a bewildering
array of uncoordinated regulatory processes. As one recent commentary put it:
From every governmental office, bureau, department, board or commission,
bureaucrats (often responding to no more than selfish demands of established
neighborhood groups or single issue environmentalist constituencies) issue a
series of decrees that can, and often do, transform a desirable and well
thought out plan of land development into an economically infeasible fiasco.
On rare occasions a court will come to the property owner's aid on particu-
larly outrageous facts, but not with such reliability as to diminish the horren-
dous risk of such enterprises .... [A] property owner is no longer confronted
merely with obtaining approval from one readily identifiable local regulatory
entity operating under a single set of clear, coherent regulations. The histori-
cal dominance of this area of the law by zoning ordinances of towns and
counties governing their own territories has been overlaid by a bureaucratic
layer cake that ranges all the way from regional and state bodies . . . to
bistate entities ... federal agencies ... [and] a multitude of mini-authorities,
such as local wetlands and historical conservation districts."
This complicated and fragmented system resulted in unacceptable levels
of bureaucratic arrogance, excess and arbitrariness. Even commentators who
favor land use controls acknowledge this negative aspect of increased regula-
during the 1970's and early 1980's. It was characterized by a judicial presumption that
land use regulations were valid; the burden of proving otherwise was on the property
owner. N. Williams, supra, §§ 5.04, 6.03. Williams observed that:
the underlying assumptions on local competence to govern, the disinterested
integrity of local decisions, and the validity of local definitions of "the general
welfare" [were] of course highly unrealistic in many situations. Yet, at the
least, at this stage American communities [were] able to capture some control
over the development of their environment ....
Id.
43. See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 31, at 85. According to Bauman:
Reasonable land use controls that are careful to take into account community
responsibilities and individual rights are necessary for the wise growth of our
vibrantly complex society, and they are here to stay. Just as any successful
business or institution must plan for the future, so, too, must government.
Land use plans and zoning provisions that are fairly adopted, substantively
sensible, consistently reliable and, when necessary, amendable, pose a major
threat to none but those few on society's fringes who are greedy for unjust
power or riches. It should be evident by now that the question of public regu-
lation of private land is not "whether" but "how" and "to what measure."
Id.
44. Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on "The White River Junction Manifesto". A
Reply to the "Gang of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of
Property, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 685, 696 (1986).
45. Id. at 697-98.
[Vol. 53
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tion. For example, five leading advocates of regulation admitted in a recent
article that "a pervasive sin ... is the practice, one might almost say the art,
of delay, delay, equivocation and never-ending 'negotiation' that has charac-
terized too many land use regulators. These actions are ubiquitous, vicious and
devoid of any resemblance of procedural due process."4 The same authors
observed that "[the] assumption that local government is often arbitrary in
dealing with the developers is by no means groundless. No one with first-hand
experience in the field would deny that municipal caprice is far more common
than it should be."4
7
Landowners began seeking compensation for regulatory takings because
this complicated and arbitrary regulatory system made judicial invalidation of
regulations a futile remedy.4" When a regulation "took" their property rights,
owners sought two principal goals: restoration of their right to use their land
and redress for losses suffered while the regulation took this right away. The
invalidation remedy failed in both respects.
Invalidation frequently failed to restore owners' property rights because
regulators often responded to such judicial decrees with another regulation, in
a seemingly endless cycle.49 The regulators saw no need to be covert about this
tactic: as one city attorney advised his fellows at a national conference, "IF
ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND
START OVER AGAIN."50 Regulatory bodies often followed this course be-
cause they wanted to prevent most or all development or use of the land they
had regulated. 51 In this situation, invalidation amounted to a mere judicial
slap-on-the-wrist, and regulators behaved accordingly.
Invalidation also failed to redress owners' economic losses, and the multi-
plication of regulators and regulations made this an increasing concern. Dur-
ing the time required to negotiate the regulatory maze, owners frequently suf-
fered major economic damage. Delay brought increased construction costs,
lost return on capital, continuing tax and mortgage payments, and the threat
or even reality of foreclosure, none of which were remedied by mere invalida-
tion of the regulation.5 2
46. The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 36, at 242-43.
47. Id. at 201-02.
48. See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 31, at 46.
49. See, e.g., Comment, Just Compensation, supra note 33, at 732-34.
50. Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regu-
lations (Including Inverse Condemnation), 38B NIMLO MUN. L. REV. 192-93 (1975)
(emphasis in original) (quoted by Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
51. See, e.g., Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has
Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261, 279-80, 286-88 (1984); Bauman, supra note 39, at 69-70;
Comment, Just Compensation, supra note 33, at 732-34. See generally R. BABCOCK,
THE ZONING GAME (1966); R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED
(1985).
52. See, e.g., Comment, Just Compensation, supra note 33, at 734-37. For an
illustrative case study of governmental arbitrariness and its potentially catastrophic fi-
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The futility of invalidation had consequences beyond its impact on ag-
grieved landowners. Because invalidation provided no redress, developers had
to cover the risk that regulations might deprive them of economically viable
use of their property, a risk inherent in the uncertainty of regulatory takings
law. They did so by increasing the return they required and passing on sub-
stantially increased costs to the consuming public.5 3
Prior to the Supreme Court's reentry into the area of regulatory takings
law after a half-century-long absence," the state of the law concerning the
compensation question was confused and unclear. The states were split on the
issue. Such states as Arizona,55 California, 56 Connecticut,5" Minnesota, "8 and
New York" had refused a compensation remedy for regulatory takings, while
such other states as Georgia," Maryland, 61 Massachusetts, 2 Nebraska,63 New
nancial consequences, see id. at 740-45 (describing the regulatory results in Prince
Georges County v. Blumberg, 44 Md. App. 79, 407 A.2d 1151 (1979), modified on
other grounds, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083(1981) (among other consequences, the landowners suffered a 10-year delay and a$1,500,000.00 increase in cost of capital)).
53. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that restrictive land use regulations
had been responsible for increasing the average price of new single-family housing in
one New Jersey area from $33,843 to $57,618. Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, - n.25, 456 A.2d 390, 441-42 n.25(1983). See generally S. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS:
CONFRONTING THE REGULATORY MAZE (1978) (regulations frequently cause signifi-
cant increases in the price of and reductions in the number of new housing units);
Berger & Kanner, supra note 33, at 697 n.51 (citing one study which found that 18 to
20 percent of the cost of housing in the San Francisco Bay area was attributable to
land use controls); Karlin, Zoning and Other Land Use Controls: From the Supply
Side, 12 Sw. U.L. REv. 561, 561-64 (1980-81) (land use regulation was a primary
cause of the doubling, tripling, and even quadrupling of housing prices in California
from 1975-1981).
54. Callies, Supreme Court Report: Takings Clause-Take Three, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1987, at 48; see also Bauman, supra note 31, at 17-18 ("[F]rom a historical
perspective, the Court, by its own choosing, [was long] absent.., from the land use
control field - it heard no zoning case between 1928 and 1974 . . . ."); The White
River Junction Manifesto, supra note 36, at 200 ("Once the United States Supreme
Court had upheld zoning in principle in the 1920's, it remained aloof from the fray,
and for nearly fifty years left zoning matters severely alone.").
55. Davis v. Pima County, 121 Ariz. 343, 590 P.2d 459, cert. denied, 442 U.S.
942 (1979), overruled, Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 149 Ariz. 538, 720 P.2d 513
(1986).
56. Agins , 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), afd on
other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
57. DeMello v. Town of Plainville, 170 Conn. 675, 368 A.2d 71 (1976).
58. McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980).
59. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350
N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
60. Clifton v. Berry, 244 Ga. 78, 259 S.E.2d 35 (1979).
61. Prince Georges County v. Blumberg, 44 Md. App. 79, 407 A.2d 1151(1979), modified on other grounds, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1083 (1981).
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Jersey,6' Ohio,6 5 and Texas 6 had been receptive to a compensation remedy.
The situation was so confused that scholars differed as to whether a majority
rule on the subject could be said to exist.67
B. The Supreme Court and the Compensation Question
1. Previous Supreme Court Attempts At An Answer
The Supreme Court approached the compensation issue four times be-
tween 1980 and 1986.68 In each of the four cases involved, the Court said it
had granted certiorari to answer the question of whether a damages remedy is
required by the just compensation clause of the federal constitution in the case
of a temporary regulatory taking.69 In each of the four cases, the Court
"backed away from a definitive ruling, believing the cases for one reason or
another were not ripe for decision."70
Many commentators criticized the Court's decisions in these four cases
for what they saw as indecisiveness.71 Some thought the Court had in fact set
62. Hamilton v. Conservation Comm'n, 12 Mass. App. 359, 425 N.E.2d 358
(1981).
63. State v. Mayhew Prods. Corp., 204 Neb. 266, 281 N.W.2d 783 (1979).
64. Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J.
1976).
65. Village of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio St. 2d 39, 278 N.E.2d 658,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 919 (1972).
66. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Teague, 556 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977),
rev'd on other grounds, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978); San Antonio River Auth. v.
Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
67. Compare Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation: Making the Whole
Equal the Sum of Its Parts, 15 URB. LAW. 447, 448 n.4 (1983), reprinted in 15 LAND
USE & ENV'T L. REV. 91, 92 n.4 (1984) (majority rule was to refuse compensation
remedy) with Comment, Just Compensation, supra note 33, at 719 ("It is impossible
to extract from state court decisions any coherent or consistent approach to the ques-
tion of whether, and under what circumstances, a monetary inverse condemnation rem-
edy should be available to property owners challenging zoning and other land use regu-
lations.") and Berger, Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
39, 44-46 (1985) (the states were split; no majority rule existed).
68. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) [hereinafter Agins II]; San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
69. Agins I1, 447 U.S. at 257; San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 623; Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. at 185; MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2565-66; see also MacDonald, 106 S. Ct.
at 2569 (White, J., dissenting) (resolving this question was the objective of the Court
in Agins I, San Diego Gas and Hamilton Bank).
70. Weidenbach, The Meaning of "First English" in the Context of Takings
Clause Jurisprudence, 28 MUN. ATr'Y, No. 4, at 6 (1987).
71. See, e.g., Bauman, Deja Vu, or Et Tu Supreme Court?, 37 LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG., No. 7, at 3 (1985) ("most would agree that, from the institutional point
of view, the Supreme Court has fallen down on the job"); Callies, The Taking Issue
Revisited, 37 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., No. 7, at 6 (1985) (Hamilton Bank re-'
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"a record for futility by deciding four cases without once reaching the issue
for which review was granted.172 Some suggested that the reason for the hesi-
tancy the Court displayed may have been a degree of rustiness and inexperi-
ence with land use regulation cases.7 3 They also called for an end to the hesita-
tion. As one author put it:
This could, at one time, have been viewed as an illustration of the Supreme
Court's preference for permitting thorough lower court disputation in search
of consensus or, at least, the airing of all possible views. The situation [by
1985], however, approaches abdication of the duty to decide cases. There will
be no consensus. Competing views have been aired. There is a clear conflict
among the federal courts of appeals on what constitutional law requires. The
states are irreconcilably split. It is time for a definitive answer."
A brief survey of the Court's holdings in these four cases will aid clear
understanding of the Court's ruling in First English.
The plaintiffs in Agins v. City of Tiburon75 owned five acres of unim-
ferred to as "this latest non-decision"); Avoiding the Taking Issue: Criticisms of the
Supreme Court's "MacDonald" Case, 38 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., No. 9, at 3
(1986) (at the 1986 Land Use Institute, speakers criticized the Court as mediocre in
general, lacking in understanding of land use regulations, even as intellectually
dishonest).
72. Sallet, Regulatory "Takings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme Court's
Search for a Solution Continues, 18 URB. LAW. 635, 655 (1986); see also Berger,
Anarchy Reigns Supreme, 29 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 39 (1985) (Agins II,
San Diego Gas and Hamilton Bank belong to the "pantheon of indecision"); Deutsch,
supra note 21, § 1.02(1)(b) ("The cases as a group may set a Supreme Court record
for futility in attempting to provide a definitive answer to a major issue.").
73. One commentator wrote:
[F]rom a historical perspective, the Court, by its own choosing, has been ab-
sent for so long from the land use control field - it heard no zoning cases
between 1928 and 1974 - that it has had difficulty adjusting to new land use
realities and seeing through the maze of appellate arguments. Having decided
the constitutional appropriateness of zoning in 1926, the Court has been con-
tent to let the lower, largely state, courts flesh out the skeleton. Now that the
Supreme Court has reentered the field in the past several years, presumably
because of perceived abuses, it may take more time than anticipated for the
Court to "get up to speed" with the lower courts' experience.
Bauman, supra note 31, at 17-18. Other commentators observed that "What is most
striking (but not entirely unexpected) about the recent spate of decisions is the ex-
traordinary degree of inexperience and even naivete which the Court has demonstrated
in handling land use issues." The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 36, at
200; see also Bauman, supra note 31, at 71.
74. Berger, supra note 72, at 46 n.39 (citations omitted).
75. 447 U.S. 255 (1980) [Agins II]. For a discussion of Agins II, see generally
Bayerd, Inverse Condemnation and the Alchemist's Lesson: You Can't Turn Regula-
tions Into Gold, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171 (1981); Ciamporcero, "Fair" Is Fair:
Valuing the Regulatory Taking, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 741 (1982); Gordon, Compen-
sable Regulatory Taking: A Tollbooth Rises on Regulation Road, 12 REAL EST. L.J.
211 (1983); Kelso, Substantive Due Process as a Limit on Police Power Regulatory
Takings, 20 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (1984); Levin & Gergacz, Open Space Zoning:
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 493 (1982); Mandelker, supra note 32, at
12
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proved ridgeland overlooking San Francisco Bay, which they had acquired for
residential development." After a consultants' report recommended acquisi-
tion of a substantial part of the ridgeland overlooking the Bay as "open
space," the City of Tiburon issued bonds for that purpose and rezoned plain-
tiffs' property to restrict its use to a maximum of five single-family dwellings
or accessory buildings or to open space use.77 Rather than submitting a devel-
opment plan limited to what the new regulations allowed, the Agin's sued the
City.78 They sought compensation for destruction of the value of their property
by the regulations and invalidation of the regulations as violative of the just
compensation clause of the fifth amendment. 9
The California trial court dismissed both claims.8 0 On appeal, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that compensation was not an available remedy for
the effect of a land use regulation.8 It stated that where a regulation substan-
tially limits the use of property, the landowner "may challenge both the con-
stitutionality of the ordinance and the manner in which it is applied to his
property by seeking . . . declaratory relief or mandamus, [but] he may not
recover damages on the theory of inverse condemnation. '8 2 The state high
court also found declaratory relief unwarranted, holding that the regulations
were not facially unconstitutional because they did not deprive plaintiffs of
491; Payne, California Downzoning Controversy to Reach the U.S. Supreme Court, 9
REAL EST. L.J. 48 (1980); Rose & Kanner, When Are Environmental Restrictions On
Land Use Compensable?, 9 REAL ET. L.J. 233 (1981); Sallet, The Problem of Munici-
pal Liability for Zoning and Land-Use Regulation, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 465 (1982);
Shedd, Inverse Condemnation: Will the Supreme Court Allow It?, 9 REAL ET. L.J.
336 (1981); Note, Agins v. City of Tiburon, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 822 (1980); Note,
Municipal Open-Space Ordinance Not a "Taking" of Property, 13 CONN. L. REV. 167
(1980); Note, Agins v. City of Tiburon A Balancing Framework For "Takings" Chal-
lenges of Zoning Ordinances, 1981 DET. C.L. REV. 179; Note, Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 11 ENVTL. L. 755 (1981); Note, Open-Space Zoning and the Taking-Clause:
A Two-Part Test, 46 Mo. L. REV. 868 (1981); Note, Supreme Court Fails to Reach
Inverse Condemnation Issue, 21 NAT. REsOURCES J. 169 (1981); Note, Agins v. City of
Tiburon An Aggrieved Party-Loss of Inverse Condemnation Actions in Zoning Ordi-
nance Disputes, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 457 (1980); Note, Agins v. City of Tiburon.
Open Space Zoning Prevails: Failure to Submit Master Plan Prevents a Cognizable
Decrease in Property Value, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 839 (1981); Note, Filling In the
Pennsylvania Coal Mine: Agins v. City of Tiburon and Supreme Court Approval of
Space Zoning, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 790. For a discussion of Agins I, see generally Note,
Agins v. City of Tiburon The Case of the Frustrated Landowner, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
157 (1979).
76. Agins I1, 447 U.S. 255, 257-58 (1980).
77. Agins I, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 270-71, 598 P.2d 25, 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 374
(1979). The city also sought to acquire the Agins's land via eminent domain, but later
abandoned those proceedings. Id. at 271, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 272, 598 P.2d at 27-28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75.
81. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
82. Id. at 269-70, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
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"substantially all reasonable use" of their property.83
The United States Supreme Court held that the issue of whether the reg-
ulation had effected a taking of plaintiffs' property was not ripe for judicial
review. Since the regulation permitted some development and the landowners
had not submitted a development plan limited to the level of development al-
lowed, no plan had been rejected. The Court found that a concrete controversy
was lacking as to whether the application of the regulation to the property
worked a taking.8 The Court also held that mere enactment of the regulation
was not a taking on its face.88 It reached this conclusion by finding that, prima
facie, the regulation met a two-part test: it substantially advanced a legitimate
state interest, and did not deny the owners' economically viable use of their
land.8"
Because the Court found no taking as the case was presented, it did not
consider "whether a State may limit the remedies available to a person whose
land has been taken without just compensation. 1 7 This result left standing the
California State Supreme Court holding in Agins I that compensation is not
available for the effect of a land use regulation.88 The bases for the California
decision on compensation are worth noting, since the Supreme Court ad-
dressed them when it finally faced the compensation issue in First English.
The California high court argued that a regulation that "goes too far"89 is
not only an invalid exercise of the police power, because it is unreasonable and
arbitrary, but also an invalid exercise of the eminent domain power, because
compensation is not provided. 90 Therefore, the high court asserted, compensa-
tion is not an available remedy for a regulation that goes too far, since al-
lowing this would "transmute an excessive use of the police power into a law-
ful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid." 9' 1 The
83. Id. at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
84. Agins II, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
85. Id. at 260-62.
86. Id. at 260. The full test applied by the Court can be outlined as follows:
(1) the regulation substantially advanced a legitimate state interest, and
(2) the regulation did not deny the owner economically viable use of his land,
since
(a) it benefitted the owner as well as the public, and this offset the diminu-
tion in value of the land, and
(b) it did not frustrate the owner's reasonable investment expectations, be-
cause 1) the best use of the land was not prohibited, and 2) no fundamental
attribute of ownership was extinguished.
Id. at 261-63.
87. Id. at 263.
88. Agins I, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 269-70, 598 P.2d 25, 26, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 373
(1979).
89. Id. at 274, 598 P.2d at 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
90. Id. at 272, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (citing with approval 1
NICHOLS, EMINENT DoMAIN § 1.42(1), at 116-21 (3d rev. ed. 1975)).
91. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 26, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 53
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only remedies allowed for regulations that go too far are declaratory relief and
mandamus.92
Two policy considerations were also cited as a basis for the California
ruling that inverse condemnation is "an inappropriate and undesirable rem-
edy" for a regulatory taking. 3 First:
[C]ommunity planners must be permitted the flexibility which their work re-
quires .... [I]f a governmental entity and its responsible officials were held
subject to a claim for inverse condemnation merely because a parcel of land
was designated for potential public use .... the process of community plan-
ning would either grind to a halt, or deteriorate to publication of vacuous
generalizations regarding the future use of land."
Second, a compensation remedy
would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of police regulatory powers at a
local level because the expenditure of public funds would be, to some extent,
within the power of the judiciary. "This threat of unanticipated financial lia-
bility will intimidate legislative bodies and will discourage the implementation
of strict or innovative planning measures in favor of measures which are less
stringent, more traditional, and fiscally safe."9
The dissent in Agins I argued that invalidation alone was so insufficient as
to amount to a "non-remedy" for landowners." It pointed out that where only
invalidation is available, even property owners who win in court must lose the
interim use of their land, often for years, and carry the burden of formidable
legal costs. 97 Further, invalidation may not end the matter. As the dissent put
it, "there is nothing to prevent the governmental agency from reenacting a
modified ordinance compelling a second or even a third proceeding-a burden
exceeding bare possibility in view of the majority's invitation to oppressive
land use limitation."98 As a consequence, the dissent predicted, many small
landowners would be "economically unable to challenge even a confiscatory
enactment," and be forced to "walk away from their properties."99
The dissent also noted the discriminatory effect often caused by un-
92. Id. at 270, 272-73, 598 P.2d at 26, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 373-75. In other
words, according to the California Supreme Court, if the government takes your prop-
erty legally, it has to pay you for it; but if it takes your property illegally, you get
nothing - and the reason you get nothing is that the government's action was illegal,
unreasonable, and arbitrary!
93. Id. at 275, 598 P.2d at 29-30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
94. Id. at 275, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (quoting Selby Realty Co.
v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 120, 514 P.2d 111, 117, 109 Cal. Rptr.
799, 805 (1973)).
95. Id. at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (quoting Hall, Eldridge v.
City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law?, 28 HASTINGs W.
1569, 1597 (1977)).
96. Id. at 283, 598 P.2d at 35, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (Clark, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
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checked land use regulations."' 0 When cities and agencies "price properties
within their control out of reach to most people," only the wealthiest can af-
ford land or construction.101 "The environment which [such cities] seek[] to
preserve will disproportionately benefit that wealthy landowner, whose home
will be surrounded by open space, unobstructed view and unpolluted
atmosphere. 10
2
The dispute in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego""3
100. Id. at 283-84, 598 P.2d at 35, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (Clark, J., dissenting).
A number of scholars have noted that increased land use regulation often masks or
fosters race and class discrimination. One treatise cites the "opportunity to zone out
'undesirables,' such as poor minorities, by zoning that increases the cost of land and
housing" as a basic reason for the widespread adoption of zoning in the United States.
D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 47, at 90-
91 (1975). See generally id., ch. 18, "Race, Poverty, and Planning and Development
Control Law: Past Present, and Future." As Justice Mosk of the California Supreme
Court observed, "No one has ever devised an ordinance to preserve an urban ghetto or
crowded central city environment; it is always to protect the outer city, the suburb, the
middle or upper class housing development." Mosk, Finding A Direction For Our Envi-
ronment, BARRISTER, Spring, 1976, at 18. In his treatise on American land planning
law, Williams cites a "built-in bias towards both fiscal zoning and exclusionary zoning"
as a major shortcoming of the land use control system. I WILLIAMS, supra note 42, §
5.04.
The regulations that achieve this objective are often promoted as protecting the
environment. One scholar observed that
Suburban exclusionary zoning in recent years has moved toward keeping
out not only the poor and minorities but often times moderate income whites
as well by the increasingly effective method of clothing highly questionable
land use practices in the respectable language of environmental protec-
tion. . . .Whenever our nation's environmental priorities of halting pollution
and conserving critical assets and resources are transposed to the seemingly
more mundane world of local zoning and subdivision control, the regrettable
effect all too often is a distortion of environmental concern to the exclusion of
legitimate land uses, such as lower priced housing. This lends a special ur-
gency to the raising of taking issue as a constitutional matter.
Bauman, supra note 31, at 90.
101. Agins I, 24 Cal. 3d at 283, 598 P.2d at 35, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
102. Id.
103. 450 U.S. 621 (1981). For a discussion of San Diego Gas, see generally
Bauman, supra note 31, at 15; Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569 (1984); Ciamporcero, "Fair" Is Fair: Valu-
ing the Regulatory Taking, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741 (1982); Freilich, supra note 33,
at 447; Glink, New Developments in Land Use and Environmental Regulation, 1984
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 1;
Gordon, Compensable Regulatory Taking: A Tollbooth Rises on Regulation Road, 12
REAL EST. L.J. 211 (1983); Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Runs
Out of Gas in San Diego, 57 IND. L.J. 45 (1982); Noel, Just Compensation: The Con-
stitutionally Required Remedy for Regulatory Takings, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1237
(1987); Payne, The Supreme Court Tries Again On Regulatory Takings, 10 REAL
EST. L.J. 252 (1982); Sallet, The Problem of Municipal Liability for Zoning and
Land-Use Regulation, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 465 (1982); Stoebuck, San Diego Gas:
Problems, Pitfalls and a Better Way, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1983);
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involved land in San Diego which the plaintiff utility had purchased as a possi-
ble nuclear power plant site while much of the property was zoned for indus-
trial use.' 04 The City then rezoned the property, reducing the industrial-use
acreage and imposing an open-space plan on most of the land.' 05 In a suit
against the City, the utility alleged violation of the just compensation clause of
the fifth amendment, and sought both compensation and prospective invalida-
tion of the regulations.10 A verdict awarding damages to the utility was af-
firmed by the California Court of Appeals. 07 The California Supreme Court,
after granting the City's petition for a hearing, retransferred the case to the
court of appeals for reconsideration in light of the intervening holding in Agins
I that compensation was not available as a remedy for regulatory takings. 08
The court of appeals then applied the Agins I rule, and threw out the damage
award.'09 After the state high court denied further review, the utility appealed
to the United States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdic-
tion due to the "absence of a final judgment."" 0 The Court said it was well
established that a state high court decision is not final if it holds that a taking
occurred but that further proceedings are required to determine what compen-
sation is due."' The state decision in San Diego Gas also was not final, the
Court said, because it presented the reverse situation: the state courts had
decided that compensation was not available, but would allow further proceed-
ings to determine whether a taking had occurred for which invalidation was
available as a remedy."12
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank, 13 the Bank claimed that the Planning Commission had violated the just
The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 36, at 183; Note, Land Use Regula-
tion As a "Taking" of Property: Proposals For Reform, 8 J. LEGIs. 278 (1981); Note,
A Regulation Gone Too Far?, 2 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 143 (1981); Note, Takings Law: Is
Inverse Condemnation An Appropriate Remedy for Due Process Violations?, 57
WASH. L. REv. 551 (1982).
104. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. 621, 624 (1981).
105. Id. at 624-26.
106. Id. at 625-26.
107. Id. at 626-27.
108. Id. at 628.
109. Id. at 629-30.
110. Id. at 623, 630.
111. Id. at 632-33.
112. Id. One commentator suggests that the "non-result" in San Diego Gas may
have happened because the majority Justices misunderstood the California procedural
rules which affected the case. Bauman, supra note 31, at 72-73.
113. 473 U.S. 172 (1985). For a discussion of Hamilton Bank, see generally
Bauman, Hamilton Bank - The Supreme Court Says: Don't Make a Federal Case
Out of Zoning Compensation, 8 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 137 (1985); Berger, supra
note 72, at 39; Sallet, Regulatory "Takings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme
Court's Search for a Solution Continues, 18 URB. LAW. 635 (1986); Salsich, Supreme
Court Again Refuses to Resolve Land Use Taking Question, 14 PROB. & PROP. 25
(1985); Smith, The Hamilton Bank Decision: Regulatory Inverse Condemnation
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compensation clause of the fifth amendment in applying a number of zoning
regulations to land the Bank owned and was developing as residential prop-
erty."' A federal jury verdict awarding damages to the Bank, overturned by
the trial judge on judgment notwithstanding the verdict, was reinstated by the
Sixth Circuit." 5 That court held that a temporary denial of the use of prop-
erty caused by a regulation could be a taking, and that damages were required
to compensate such takings." 6 The Commission appealed that ruling to the
United States Supreme Court." 7
In its Hamilton Bank opinion, the Supreme Court announced that the
Bank's claim was not ripe for judicial review." 8 In doing so, the Court put two
new procedural barriers in the way of bringing a successful regulatory taking
claim in federal court. The Court said that such a claim is not ripe for federal
litigation until the landowner (1) obtains a final decision by the regulatory
body regarding the application of regulation to the property, including a deci-
sion on waiver or variance applications, and (2) seeks compensation through
state litigation if the state provides an adequate procedure for doing so. 19 Ac-
cording to the Court, the Bank's claim was not ripe because it had done
neither of these things. 120
The Court gave two reasons for imposing these procedural requirements.
The first was that the Court regarded "the economic impact of the challenged
action and the extent to which it interferes with reasonable investment-backed
expectations" as significant to determining whether a taking had occurred.'
The Court held that these factors "simply cannot be evaluated until the ad-
ministrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it
will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question."' 2  The
second reason involved the abstention doctrine. The Court stated that "if a
State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the prop-
erty owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause [in fed-
eral court] until it has used the [state] procedure and been denied just com-
Claims Encounter Some New Obstacles, 29 WASH. U.J. URn. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1985);
Sterk, Government Liability for Unconstitutional Land Use Regulation, 60 IND. L.J.
113 (1984); Note, Ripeness for the Taking Clause: Finality and Exhaustion in Wil-
liamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q.
625 (1986).
114. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 175 (1985).
115. Id. at 183-84.
116. Id. at 184.
117. Id. at 185.
118. Id. at 186.
119. Id. at 186-94. For a discussion of the exhaustion requirement in the context
of land use regulations, see generally Morgan, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
as a Municipal Defense to Inverse Condemnation Actions, 1985 INSTITUTE ON PLAN-
NING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN § 9.1.
120. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 186.
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pensation."' 23 This is so because "the State's action here is not 'complete' until
the State fails to provide adequate compensation for the taking. 1 24
The Court distinguished the finality requirement it imposed from both
exhaustion of administrative remedies and legal proceedings seeking invalida-
tion of the regulation . 25 Neither exhaustion nor a request for invalidation, it
said, is a prerequisite to an inverse condemnation action. 12 16 Exhaustion in-
volves procedures offering review of the regulatory body's decision, whereas
the finality required for ripeness involves procedures that either establish the
definitive position of the regulatory body as to application of the regulation to
the property involved, or allow compensation to be sought for a taking.
27
While use of review procedures is not prerequisite to federal litigation, use of
position-defining or compensation-seeking procedures is.128
The plaintiff in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County129 sued
for compensation and declaratory relief after the county planning commission
rejected a subdivision proposal concerning the plaintiff's land.130 The suit
claimed that the county intended to restrict the land to agricultural or open
space use by denying approval for all development plans, and in effect prevent-
ing the "entire economic use" of the property. 31 It also alleged that any appli-
cation for variances or other relief would be futile.132 The California trial
court dismissed the complaint, rejecting the compensation claim on the basis
of the Agins I holding that compensation is not available for regulatory tak-
ings. 3 ' The state appellate and high courts affirmed the dismissal, and appeal
to the Supreme Court followed."3
In its MacDonald opinion, the Supreme Court once again found the com-
pensation issue not ripe for decision. It announced that "on further considera-
tion of our jurisdiction to hear this appeal . . . we find ourselves unable to
address the merits of [the compensation] question." 3 '
The Court asserted that a regulatory taking claim has two components,
the first being a showing that "the regulation has in substance 'taken' prop-
erty-that is that the regulation 'goes too far.' "136 With regard to this first
component, the MacDonald Court essentially followed the holding of Hamil-
123. Id. at 195.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 192-93; see also id. at 194 n.13.
126. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 192-93.
127. Id. at 194 n.13.
128. Id.
129. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
130. Id. at 2563.
131. Id. at 2563-64.
132. Id. at 2564.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2565.
135. Id. at 2566.
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ton Bank. As the Court put it, a final determination by the regulatory author-
ity of the "type and intensity of development legally permitted" on the prop-
erty under the regulation is a prerequisite to assertion of a regulatory takings
claim because "a court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone 'too
far' unless it knows how far the regulation goes. ' 13 7 Because such a final deci-
sion had not been obtained by the plaintiff in MacDonald, the Court was "in
doubt regarding the antecedent question whether . . . property ha[d] been
taken." 38
The second component of a regulatory taking claim, according to the
MacDonald majority, is a demonstration that "any proffered compensation is
not just."'139 The Court mentioned transfer development rights and tax remis-
sions as possible examples."10 The discussion of this point was dictum, since no
compensation had been proffered in the case, and the second component did
not figure in the holding."' However, the Court did appear to suggest that
such alternatives to monetary damages might satisfy the just compensation
clause.
2. Brennan's Dissent in San Diego Gas
The most consequential feature of the Court's four abortive attempts at
answering the compensation question was the regulatory takings theory enun-
ciated in Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas."2 After disposing of the
majority's notion that the California courts had not decided whether a regula-
tory taking had occurred,"1 3 Brennan reached the taking issue for which cer-
137. Id. This ripeness requirement is not, however, unlimited. The Court de-
clared, "A property owner is of course not required to resort to piecemeal litigation or
otherwise unfair procedures in order to obtain this determination" of what use will be
allowed under the regulation. Id. at 2567 n:7.
138. Id. at 2568-69. The Court commented that the landowner had alleged "only
one intense type of residential development," and that the owner "could [still] seek an
administrative application of the [regulations] which ... would allow development to
proceed." Id. at 2568 n.8. It also observed that "rejection of exceedingly grandiose
development plans does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive simi-
larly unfavorable reviews." Id. at 2569 n.9.
139. Id. at 2566.
140. Id. at 2567. These forms of compensation had been discussed in dictum in
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 112-15, 112 n.13 (1978).
141. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2567-69.
142. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. "[T]he Court of Appeal held that the city's exercise of its police power,
however arbitrary or excessive, could not as a matter of federal constitutional law
constitute a 'taking' under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore that
there was no 'taking' without just compensation in the instant case." San Diego Gas,
450 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Brennan observed that
the possibility of retrial on remand was based on the notion that the landowner might
allege "overzealous use of the police power," a different constitutional theory. Id. at
643. Findings of fact relevant to that theory, Brennan noted, would "have no bearing
[Vol. 53
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tiorari had been granted. Since the dissent had considerable effect on subse-
quent lower federal and state court opinions,"" and was cited with approval in
First English, 45 it is worth considering in some detail.
Brennan first addressed the issue of whether a valid police power regula-
tion can ever effect a fifth amendment taking, an issue implicit in the basic
question of whether a government entity must compensate when a regulation
works a taking. 46 The California Supreme Court had ruled in Agins P17 that
a police power regulation could never constitute a taking within the meaning
of the fifth amendment. Brennan found that this idea "flatly contradicts clear
precedents of this Court."'1
48
The principle running through these precedents, said Brennan, derived
from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.14 9 In Mahon the Court had declared,
"The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 'taking.' ",'50 Bren-
nan noted the Mahon Court's acknowledgment that "government could hardly
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law."151 Nevertheless,
Brennan maintained the Mahon Court "rejected the proposition that police
power restrictions could never be recognized as a Fifth Amendment
'taking.' ,,151
Brennan rejected the interpretation of Mahon, advanced by advocates of
increased regulation, that says the Mahon Court used the word "taking" met-
aphorically.153 Under this view, the real challenge to the regulation in Mahon,
on a Fifth Amendment 'taking' claim." Id. Brennan concluded that "[i]t is clear that
the California Supreme Court has held that California courts in a challenge, as here, to
a police power regulation, are barred from holding that a Fifth Amendment 'taking'
requiring just compensation has occurred." Id. at 642 (emphasis in original).
144. See infra notes 176-191 ana accompanying text.
145. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378, 2386, 2386 n.9, 2388 (1987).
146. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 646-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 272-73, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979).
148. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 647. Brennan cited Agins 11, 447 U.S. 255
(1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), and other cases.
149. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
150. Id. at 416.
151. Id. at 413.
152. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. 621, 650 (1981). As Brennan observed, the
Mahon court found that the regulation in that case effected a taking. Id.
153. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 198 (1985) ("Those who argue that excessive regulation should be
considered a violation of the Due Process Clause rather than a 'taking' assert that
Pennsylvania Coal used the word 'taking' not in the literal Fifth Amendment sense,
but as a metaphor for actions having the same effect as a taking by eminent domain.").
Obviously, if one wishes to rule out compensation for the effects of any and all police
power regulations, one must advance some such device for distinguishing away Mahon,
1988]
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and the basis of the ruling, was that the regulation was an invalid exercise of
the police power under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. Brennan
observed that "in addition to tampering with the express language of
[Mahon], this view ignores the [property owner's] repeated claim before the
Court that the [regulation] took its property without just compensation."' 54
Precedent also established, said Brennan, that regulatory takings are "es-
sentially similar" to other takings.15 5 As the Court had previously announced:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing [the just
compensation clause] . . it shall be held that if the government refrains from
the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy
its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent,
can in effect subject it to total destruction without making any compensation,
because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public
use.
156
Brennan observed that police power regulations "can destroy the use and en-
joyment of property in order to promote the public good just as effectively as
formal condemnation or physical invasion of property. 11 7 Brennan labelled as
irrelevant the theory that police power regulations do not effect takings be-
cause the government does not intend to take property through the regulation.
As he put it, "[T]he Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a
State says, or by what it intends, but by what it does." 58
According to Brennan, the test for when a police power regulation has
"gone too far" and thus worked a taking, is whether "the effects [of the regu-
lation] completely deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the
property."'1 5
9
Brennan next addressed the question of whether compensation is the re-
quired remedy for a regulatory taking. He found a clear constitutional answer:
"[O]nce a court establishes that there was, a regulatory 'taking,' the Constitu-
tion demands that the government pay just compensation for the period com-
mencing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking,' and ending on
the date the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the reg-
ulation."' 6 0 In Brennan's view, this result is compelled by the express language
and self-executing character of the fifth amendment.
As soon as private property has been taken, whether through formal condem-
nation proceedings, occupancy, physical invasion, or regulation, the landowner
the leading case concerning regulatory takings.
154. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. 621, 649 n.14 (1981).
155. Id. at 651.
156. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78 (1871) (em-
phasis in original).
157. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 652.
158. Id. at 653 (quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
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has already suffered a constitutional violation, and "the self-executing charac-
ter of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation," is triggered.
This Court has consistently recognized that the just compensation require-
ment in the Fifth Amendment is not precatory: once there is a "taking," com-
pensation must be awarded.161
Brennan maintained that invalidation alone "would fall far short" of the
demands of the just compensation clause, which is designed to prevent the
government from forcing "some individuals to bear burdens which, in all fair-
ness, should be borne by the public as a whole."162 Since police power regula-
tions must be based on advancement of the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare, the public "receives a benefit while the offending regulation is
in effect."1 63 If a valid police power regulation deprives a property owner of all
or most of the use and enjoyment of his property and thus meets the test for a
regulatory taking, fairness demands that "the public bear the cost of benefits
received during the interim period between application of the regulation and
the government entity's rescission of it.""
Brennan declared that "the fact that a regulatory 'taking' may be tempo-
rary, by virtue of the government's power to rescind or amend the regulation,
does not make it any less of a constitutional 'taking.' "165 He noted that the
just compensation clause does not say that only permanent or irrevocable tak-
ings are to be compensated, and that the Court had long recognized that tem-
porary takings are subject to the same constitutional analysis as permanent
takings.168
Brennan stated that "the applicability of express constitutional guaran-
tees is not a matter to be determined on the basis of policy judgments made by
the legislative, executive, or judicial branches. '"1 7 Therefore, he maintained,
the California Supreme Court was wrong in deciding Agins I on the policy
basis that just compensation is undesirable in regulatory takings cases. 68
Brennan took note of suggestions by land use planning commentators that the
"threat of financial liability for unconstitutional police power regulations
would help to produce a more rational basis of decisionmaking" through appli-
161. Id. at 654 (quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980),
which quotes 6 J. SACKMAN, NiCHo&S' LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 25.41 (rev. 3d ed.
1980)) (emphasis in original).
162. Id. at 656.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 656-57.
165. Id. at 657.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 661.
168. Agins 1, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 275, 598 P.2d 25, 29, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376
(1979). The California Supreme Court had argued that compensation was undesirable
because of the need for flexibility in land use planning, and the potential chilling finan-
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cation of cost-benefit analysis. 6 9 He commented that:
[S]uch liability might also encourage municipalities to err on the constitu-
tional side of police power regulations, and to develop internal rules and oper-
ating procedures to minimize overzealous regulatory attempts. After all, if a
policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a planner? In any event,
one may wonder as an empirical matter whether the threat of just compensa-
tion will greatly impede the efforts of planners. 17 0
Justice Brennan's proposed regulatory takings doctrine can be summa-
rized as follows. When government regulations deprive a landowner of all or
most of the use and enjoyment of his property, the regulation has worked a
fifth amendment taking.' When that occurs, a remedy in damages is com-
pelled by the just compensation clause of the federal Constitution. 712 If the
regulating entity chooses to rescind the regulation, the government must com-
pensate only for the period during which the regulation temporarily "took" the
property.1' 3
The logic and fairness of Brennan's opinion compelled acknowledgment
even by pro-regulation commentators. As one opponent of the compensation
remedy observed:
On a theoretical basis as well, Justice Brennan's position has greater analyti-
cal force than do the [regulators'] contentions .... The [pro-regulation] con-
tention that physical invasion or the invocation of eminent domain proceed-
ings are the sole methods of 'taking' is based on a distinction that is at odds
with economic reality. Landowners whose properties are seized by the govern-
ment may suffer no greater financial harm than landowners who are told, by
means of open-space plans, that they may not develop their property in any
manner. Yet the [regulators'] view of the fifth amendment would establish a
constitutional distinction based precisely on that difference.174
That logic and fairness, coupled with the fact that there were, arguably,
five votes on the Court for the Brennan opinion,"" soon proved influential with
the lower federal and state supreme courts. The predominant trend in regula-
169. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981).
170. Id. (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 653.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 658.
174. Sallet, The Problem of Municipal Liability for Zoning and Land-Use Reg-
ulation, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 465, 477 (1982). In spite of this recognition, Sallet argued
that policy considerations, including financial risk to local governments and a chilling
effect on land use regulation in general, should outweigh Brennan's arguments. Id. at
477-78.
175. The Brennan dissent had carried four votes, those of Justices Brennan,
Stewart, Marshall and Powell. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 636. The "fifth vote" was
that of Justice Rehnquist. In his concurring opinion, Rehnquist observed that if he had
been satisfied that a final decision had been made concerning application of the regula-
tion to the property in the case, he "would have little difficulty in agreeing with much
of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan." Id. at 633-34.
[Vol. 53
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tory takings cases decided in those courts after San Diego Gas was to apply
the Brennan doctrine. 76 The Fifth,'177 Sixth,17 8 Seventh,179 Eighth,180 Ninth,"81
and Eleventh28 2 Circuits, the United States Claims Court,18 3 and the highest
176. See Bauman, supra note 31, at 47; Berger & Kanner, supra note 33, at
696; Freilich & Pal, New Developments in Land Use and Environmental Regulation,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.02
(1985) ("It is significant to note that a growing number of federal and state appellate
courts are endorsing Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City
of San Diego and are recognizing that temporary regulatory interferences with prop-
erty can be a compensable taking."); see also Morgan, supra note 119, § 9.01(1).
177. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1198-1200 (5th Cir. 1981)
(fifth circuit "reassured" of correctness of its view that a damages remedy is required
for regulatory takings under Brennan's San Diego Gas opinion), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
907 (1982).
178. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 398 (6th
Cir. 1984) (well established that regulation can effect taking; Brennan opinion cited for
rationale), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Hamilton Bank v. Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402, 408-09 (6th Cir. 1984) (Brennan
opinion represents view of majority of Supreme Court; sixth circuit agrees and holds
compensation must be paid for regulatory taking), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S.
172 (1985).
179. Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 482 nn.5-6 (7th Cir. 1982) (Brennan
opinion is view of Supreme Court majority; regulatory taking therefore requires con-
demnation); Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138, 141-45 (7th Cir. 1981) (well established
that taking can result from police power to regulate property, and Brennan opinion to
that effect is view of Supreme Court majority), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 836 (1984).
180. Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 504, 505 & n.2 (8th Cir.
1985) (Brennan opinion represents Supreme Court majority view; several circuits have
adopted it, and its view that compensation is required for temporary regulatory taking
is persuasive).
181. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Summerland County Water Dist.,
767 F.2d 544, 547 (9th Cir. 1985) (Brennan opinion represents Supreme Court major-
ity view; Agins I therefore on "precedential precipice," but proper to invoke abstention
doctrine to allow state to alter own law); Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist.,
703 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir.) (Supreme Court majority agrees with Brennan; dam-
ages therefore are recoverable for regulatory taking), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847
(1983); In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia On April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.7
(9th Cir. 1982) (Brennan view represents Supreme Court majority and, notwithstand-
ing Agins I, the ninth circuit assumes regulation can effect a taking for which compen-
sation must be paid); see also Shamrock Dev. Co. v. City of Concord, 656 F.2d 1380
(9th Cir. 1981).
182. Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038,
1043 (1lth Cir. 1982) (Brennan opinion is authority for view that compensation is
remedy for regulatory takings); see also Charles J. Arndt, Inc. v. City of Birmingham,
748 F.2d 1486 (llih Cir. 1984).
183. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985) (Brennan was
"speaking for an apparent majority of the Court" in his San Diego Gas opinion, which
is authority for view that regulation that goes too far exercises eminent domain), arid
in part, vacated in part, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 926
(1987); Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1190 & n.13 (Ct. CI. 1981)
(Brennan opinion cited for reasoning behind proposition that a regulation can effect a
taking, which is "well established as a matter of law"; Rehnquist's general agreement
19881
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courts of Arizona,'" Minnesota, 85 New Hampshire, 186 North Dakota,187 Ore-
gon,188 Rhode Island, ' 9 and Wisconsin1 0 followed Justice Brennan's analysis
and accepted compensation as the proper remedy for regulatory takings.191
The Brennan theory of regulatory takings appeared to have become the
majority rule. However, a split in authority remained, as the first Circuit 9 2
and the high courts of Florida 19 3 and North Carolina1 9 4 rejected the Brennan
with Brennan noted), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1017 (1982); Jentgen v. United States,
657 F.2d 1210, 1212 & n.3 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1017 (1982) (same
language as Deltona opinion).
184. Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 149 Ariz. 538, 720 P.2d 513, cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
185. Pratt v. State, 309 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1981).
186. Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981).
187. Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983).
188. Suess Builders Co. v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or. 254, 656 P.2d 306 (1982).
189. Annicelli v. Town of S. Kingston, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1983).
190. Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
191. Cf. Pioneer Sand & Gravel v. Anchorage, 627 P.2d 651, 652-53 (Alaska
1981) (reserving judgment on inverse condemnation remedy, but allowing case to pro-
ceed to trial); Valley View Industrial Park v. City of Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621,
643-44, 733 P.2d 182, 195 (1987) (recognizing Brennan's opinion, but distinguishing
the facts); Schwartz v. City of Flint, 426 Mich. 295, 315 & n.14, 395 N.W.2d 678,
686 & n.14 (1986) (recognizing the Brennan theory and noting states following it, but
declining "at this time" to consider it since plaintiff had not sought damages); County
of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins., 653 P.2d 766, 779 (Haw. 1982) (citing Bren-
nan's opinion as authority for, definition of regulatory taking), appeal dismissed, 460
U.S. 1077 (1984).
In his analysis of the historical stages of land use law in American courts, Wil-
liams describes the period of these recent cases as a fourth historical stage, which he
labels "Sophisticated Judicial Review." 1 WILLIAMS, supra note 42, § 5.05. Bauman
summarizes this stage as "characterized by careful judging of the rights and interests
of government, landowners, existing neighbors and excluded residents, depending on
the particular parties to a case. The sophisticated fourth stage replaces the third pe-
riod's automatic presumption of governmental validity with a healthy judicial skepti-
cism of government's motives and competence in devising and implementing various
land use controls." Bauman, supra note 31, at 75. In Williams's view, the "appropriate
approach to land use controls" which characterizes this fourth stage is a judicial atti-
tude which is "basically sympathetic, yet cautious and skeptical," and one which in-
volves "careful inquiry into the actual operation of the controls involved, within an
overall context. This is the revival of creative judicial review ... as an active force to
protect really basic values . . . ." I WILLIAMS, supra note 42, § 5.05.
192. Citadel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 695 F.2d 31, 33-34, 33 n,4
(1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983) (policy arguments make compensa-
tion inappropriate remedy for regulatory taking; Brennan position has four votes plus
possible fifth vote from Rehnquist, but change of position on that basis would be "judi-
cial tea leaf reading," and San Diego Gas is distinguishable as state rather than federal
court case).
193. Dade County v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 1984).
But see Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981).
194. Responsible Citizens in Opposition to the Flood Plain Ordinance v. City of
Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 302 S.E.2d 204 (1983).
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analysis. A definitive statement by a majority of the Supreme Court was
needed.' 95
C. Land Use Regulation Issues Prior to First English
When First English came before the Supreme Court, three major ques-
tions formed the center of dispute in land use regulation law. An outline of
these questions will clarify the implications of the First English decision.
1. The Takings Question
The first of the three major questions in dispute was whether a police
power regulation can effect a "taking" within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment. This question involved interpretation of "taken," the first of the two key
terms in the just compensation clause.
The Supreme Court declined repeatedly to construct a general definition
of regulatory takings, on the grounds that the parameters of a fifth amend-
ment taking differ with the facts of each case. 196 Within the general rubric of
195. The de facto majority-rule status of the Brennan doctrine was diminished
by the fact that it had not been embodied in a majority opinion by the Supreme Court.
Even the argument that Brennan's theory actually commanded five votes was clouded.
Justice Stewart, who had voted with Brennan, had retired. The views of Justice
O'Connor, who replaced Stewart, were largely unknown, although she had voted with
the lack-of-ripeness majorities in Hamilton Bank and MacDonald. Williamson Re-
gional Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 174 (1985); MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2562 (1986). The picture was further
complicated by the fact that Justice White, who voted with the majority in San Diego
Gas, had dissented in MacDonald on the grounds that Justice Brennan had been cor-
rect in his San Diego Gas dissent. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2569, 2572-73 (White, J.,
dissenting). In addition, White's MacDonald dissent was joined by Justice Rehnquist,
the putative fifth vote for the Brennan view in San Diego Gas. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct.
at 2569, 2572-73 (White, J., dissenting). Although the net result seemed to be that five
votes (Brennan, Marshall and Powell from San Diego Gas, plus White and Rehnquist
from MacDonald) could be marshalled for the Brennan theory, a majority holding by
the Court was still lacking. This view of the likely votes proved to be correct - the
First English majority consisted of these five plus Justice Scalia, who joined the Court
after MacDonald was decided and in effect replaced Chief Justice Burger. First Eng-
lish, 107 S. Ct. at 2381.
196. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 998 (1984); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Commentators have deprecated this approach as
a judicial abdication. See Berger & Kanner, supra note 33, at 693, 695. They have also
compared the approach to the Court's former "I know it when I see it" posture in
obscenity cases. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring);
see, e.g., Berger & Kanner, supra note 33, at 695; Bauman, supra note 31, at 3-4.
One problem with this approach is the resulting lack of legal predictability for
either regulators and planners or landowners, with an attendant waste of the resources
of both parties and courts. Another is a chilling effect on basic property rights.
A supposed 'property' system in which the ostensible owner cannot tell what
rights he "owns" until he tries to exercise them, and even then only after
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the ad hoc approach, the Court established a few more precise definitional
elements. Some of these defined a regulatory taking in the negative. The Court
found that mere denial of the most profitable use which can be made of a
property,297 or of the property's highest and best use, 98 did not amount to a
fifth amendment taking. Effective denial of all reasonable or economically via-
ble use of the property, however, had usually been found to be a taking.199 A
"war emergency exception" also existed. Wartime regulations ordering mine
closings 200 or regulating prices or profits20 ' did not amount to takings. One
positive, per se definition had been established. The Court had declared that a
taking existed and the compensation requirement was triggered where even the
smallest physical occupation or appropriation by the government was found. 201
One survey of Supreme Court cases on regulatory takings reports that, in
various contexts, the Court had developed and applied four common, often
overlapping tests for the existence of a regulatory taking.203 Three of these
tests are frequently relevant in current cases.20'
The Diminution of Value Test was established in the leading regulatory
taking case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 05 This test examines the regu-
lation's effect on the value of the landowner's property interests. It focuses on,
but does not define, the point at which the regulation's effect becomes "so
severe that it moves beyond the boundary of uncompensated police power ac-
ruinously costly (and often pointless) administrative proceedings with a multi-
tier appellate process and, after that, litigation, is an illusion. Only tile most
wealthy (and the most determined) persons can even try to seek protection of
their constitutional rights.
Berger & Kanner, supra note 33, at 693 n.34. Other commentators, however, find vir-
tue in this ad hoe approach.
The taking issue as we know it is only some twenty years old. With the quan-
tum jump in land use controls ... people have been forced to re-think previ-
ously set notions of private property, public control and land use regulation.
That exercise necessarily takes time, and two decades is relatively little time
to mesh changing conditions with constitutional principles.
Bauman, supra note 31, at 20-21. Those espousing this view predict that as the com-
mon law of regulatory takings develops, general standards will emerge. Id. at 30-31.
197. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
198. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
199. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
200. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
201. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
202. Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
203. Bauman, supra note 31, at 21.
204. The first test discussed is the Physical Invasion Test, established in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) (flooding of land due to the
negligent building of a dam by the government). This is "the least complicated of the
taking tests," since it is like an actual exercise of eminent domain in that both produce
a "concrete interruption of use of someone's private property." Bauman, supra note 31,
at 22 (emphasis added). Given the nature of modern land use regulations, it is seldom
of much relevance to the question of regulatory takings.
205. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). Bauman refers to the diminution of value test as the
"most famous" of the four tests. Bauman, supra note 31, at 22.
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tion and becomes a taking (i.e., a de facto exercise of the eminent domain
power) which requires compensation.120 8 As the Mahon Court put it, "while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking. 207 As to how far is "too far," scholars have noted
that while the Diminution of Value Test "has been applied with varying re-
sults in different cases, all concur that the diminution must be substantial.120 8
The Nuisance Abatement Test derived from Mugler v. Kansas.2 19 In
Mugler the Court held that, given the public evils resulting from alcohol, a
brewery could be regarded as a public nuisance, and therefore regulatory pro-
hibition of it was not a compensable taking. This test focuses on "what the
government means to accomplish rather than on the extent of harm infficted
upon an individual property owner."21
The Balancing Test originated in Lawton v. Steele,2 1 1 and was restated in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.21 2 It balances "the
interests of public good and private detriment ... an all inclusive approach
that emphasizes fairness to the parties involved . *.". ."I" The Penn Central
Court considered three main factors under this test: "[1] the economic impact
of the challenged regulation on the claimant, [2] the character of the govern-
ment action and [3] whether an acquisition of resources by the public was
sought. 21 4 The Lawton Court had looked at three similar factors: (1) whether
the public interest required the interference with the property rights in ques-
tion, (2) whether the means chosen were reasonably necessary to accomplish
the purpose, and (3) whether the results were unduly oppressive of individu-
als.21 5 In other words, the Balancing Test might be said to balance ends,
means, and results.
Perhaps the greatest conceptual difficulty in the mix of regulatory taking
arguments which confronted the First English Court was the proposition that
compensable takings and valid regulations should be seen as mutually exclu-
sive.218 Those who asserted that a regulation cannot work a taking argued
from Mugler and its progeny217 that a regulation valid under the police power
does not invoke the eminent domain power, and by definition does not amount
to a taking.218 The Supreme Court had repeatedly held that the question of
206. Berger & Kanner, supra note 33, at 692.
207. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
208. Weidenbach, supra note 70, at 8.
209. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
210. Bauman, supra note 31, at 22.
211. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
212. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
213. Bauman, supra note 31, at 23.
214. Bauman, supra note 31, at 23.
215. See Lawton, 152 U.S. at 137.
216. Bauman, supra note 31, at 32.
217. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
218. See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 32, at 491; Sallet, The Problem of Munici-
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whether the objective of a regulation is a proper object of the police power is
distinct and separate from the question of whether an otherwise valid regula-
tion transgresses the just compensation clause.2 19 In the two leading cases on
zoning regulations, decided in the 1920's,22° the Court had implicitly recog-
nized that a valid regulation can amount to a taking. However, the argument
persisted, and made an appearance in First English.22'
2. The Compensation Question
The second question at the center of dispute was whether monetary dam-
ages are available as a remedy for a regulatory taking. This question involved
interpretation of "just compensation," the second of the two key terms in the
just compensation clause. When First English came before the Court, the
lower federal and state high courts were split on this question, although the
trend of decisions in the five years preceding First English had been to follow
Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas in finding that compensation was
the appropriate remedy for a regulatory taking.
222
Implicit in the compensation question was a corollary issue: should policy
considerations relating to land use regulation dictate that compensation not be
found available as a remedy for regulatory takings? Some courts, notably the
California Supreme Court in Agins /,228 and many pro-regulation commenta-
pal Liability for Zoning and Land-Use Regulation, 31 CATH. U.L. REv. 465, 465
(1982).
219. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
425 (1982) ("It is a separate question, however, whether an otherwise valid regulation
so frustrates property rights that compensation must be paid."); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979) ("There is no question but that Congress
could assure the public a free right of access to [a marina] if it so chose. Whether a
statute or regulation that went so far amounted to a 'taking,' however, is an entirely
separate question."); see also United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70
(1982) (whether a particular exercise of Congress's bankruptcy power meets the ra-
tionality test is entirely separate from the question of whether the taking of property
involved falls under the prohibition of the fifth amendment).
220. In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Court upheld
zoning as a valid exercise of the police power. In Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277
U.S. 183 (1928), the Court held that application of a zoning ordinance which rendered
a parcel of land useless violated the Constitution. Together, these two cases reflect the
approach taken in Mahon: the police power and the eminent domain power both lie on
the same continuum, and a regulation which takes all or most of the use of a piece of
land may be valid under the police power but nevertheless violate the fifth amendment.
Commentators have interpreted Justice Brennan's San Diego Gas dissent as em-
bodying this continuum concept. See, e.g., The White River Junction Manifesto, supra
note 36, at 221 ("Under the Brennan approach, taking analysis requires viewing regu-
lation as a continuum of governmental actions that ultimately crosses an invisible line
that divides compensable from non-compensable actions."); see also Bauman, supra
note 31, at 83.
221. See infra notes 258-68 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 176-94 and accompanying text.
223. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
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tors,224 had advanced two policy arguments as grounds for barring a compen-
sation remedy. They posited that a compensation remedy would (1) create
enormous financial risk for regulatory bodies, and (2) "have a chilling effect"
on land use regulation, and that this made compensation "an inappropriate
and undesirable remedy in cases in which unconstitutional regulation is
alleged. 22 5
3. The Timing Question
The third question at the heart of the takings dispute confronting the
First English court was this: Assuming that a regulation can work a taking,
when does it do so? This question involved determination of when a regulatory
taking begins, and of the effect caused when a such a taking ends. Put differ-
ently, the question was whether the temporary effect of a regulation can con-
stitute a taking.22
6
The question of when a regulatory taking begins-that is, of the point
from which compensation must be paid-was unsettled when the Court took
up First English. Some commentators argued that the Agins I decision by the
California high court,227 left intact by the Supreme Court decision in Agins
11,228 implied that a regulatory taking begins only when a court rules that a
taking has occurred.2 29 They saw support for this view in Danforth v. United
States,230 in which the Supreme Court had observed that "mere fluctuations in
value during the process of governmental decision making, absent extraordi-
nary delay, are 'incidents of ownership.' They cannot be considered as a 'tak-
ing' in the constitutional sense." 231 Justice Brennan's influential dissent in San
Diego Gas, however, argued that the beginning point was "the date the regula-
tion first effected the 'taking.' ",232 Brennan noted that "[a]s soon as private
224. See, e.g., Girard, Constitutional "Takings Clauses" and the Regulation of
Private Land Use, 34 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Oct. 1982, at 4, Nov. 1982, at 4;
Sallet, The Problem of Municipal Liability for Zoning and Land-Use Regulation, 31
CATH. U.L. REV. 465, 465 (1982); The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 36,
at 193.
225. Agins I, 24 Cal. 3d at 275-76, 598 P.2d at 29-30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376-77.
226. Freilich, supra note 33, at 95 ("As much emphasis needs to be placed on
when a property interest is invaded and destroyed so as to trigger constitutional relief,
[a question which] rais[es] the significant issues of the time of the 'taking,' exhaustion
of administrative remedies ... and whether a [temporary] deprivation ... is a constitu-
tional violation.").
227. Agins I, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372.
228. 477 U.S. 255 (1980).
229. This follows from the California high court's ruling that only prospective
relief - declaratory relief or mandamus - is available to remedy the effect of a regu-
lation. Agins 1, 24 Cal. 3d at 269-70, 598 P.2d at 26, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 373; see also
Sallet, Regulatory "Takings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme Court's Search
for a Solution Continues, supra note 33, at 641-42.
230. 308 U.S. 271 (1939).
231. Id. at 285.
232. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981)
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property has been taken, whether through formal condemnation proceedings,
occupancy, physical invasion, or regulation, the landowner has already suf-
fered a constitutional violation," which triggers the self-executing compensa-
tion provision of the just compensation clause. 2" 3
The effect caused when a regulatory taking ends, and thus becomes tem-
porary, was also unsettled. Brennan's dissent posited that a regulatory taking
required compensation even if the regulation's effect was temporary due to
governmental amendment or rescission.2" He noted that compensation for
temporary physical takings had long been the rule,2 35 and that physical and
regulatory takings were essentially similar.3 6
The California Supreme Court, on the other hand, argued that govern-
ment should be given a chance to rescind or amend in order to avoid negative
financial consequences and discouragement of regulation.237 It held in Agins
238 that invalidation, not compensation, was the appropriate remedy for the
period between the regulation's effective date and the date of judicial
review.2 3 9
These three fundamental and unsettled questions-the takings question,
the compensation question, and the timing question-faced the Court when it
took up First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles.
III. THE First English DECISION
The primary significance of the procedural posture in which First English
reached the Supreme Court lies in the fact that the compensation question to
which the Court granted certiorari was divorced from the facts of the case.
The question was presented by procedural motions granted on the basis of the
Agins I holding that compensation is not an available remedy for a temporary
regulatory taking. The Supreme Court found that "the disposition of the case
on these grounds isolates the remedial question for our consideration."24 0 The
lower court rulings did not depend on a rejection of the church's allegation
that the regulation deprived it of all use of the property, or on a holding that
the type of regulation involved can never constitute a Fifth Amendment tak-
ing.2 " The Court observed that the case did not require it to decide whether
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 654 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 657.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 651.
237. Agins I, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 275, 598 P.2d 25, 29-30, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 376
(1979).
238. Id.
239. Agins 1, 24 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
240. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
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the regulation "actually denied appellant all use of its property," '242 or whether
the regulation did not effect a taking because its police power objective was
safety.2 3 The question presented was the one the Court had struggled for
seven years to reach: "whether the Just Compensation Clause requires the
government to pay for 'temporary' regulatory takings."244
A. The Takings Question
First English gave the least definite of its answers to the question of
whether a valid police power regulation can effect a "taking" within the mean-
ing of the fifth amendment. Pro-regulation commentators are already arguing
that First English does not answer this question at all.245 The ambiguity of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion on this point, which compares unfavorably
with the forthright approach of Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas, appears to
have made further litigation on the takings question inevitable. 246
First English did reaffirm the validity of the basic doctrine of regulatory
takings, established in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, that "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking. 2 47 It was because Agins I "truncated" the efficacy of the
Mahon rule-that is, because it held that deprivation of property rights by
regulations was not protected as a just compensation clause taking-that the
First English Court held Agins I to be constitutionally fallacious. 24 8 The
Court also declared that the just compensation clause
does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition
on the exercise of that power. This basic understanding of the Amendment
makes clear that it is designed not to limit the governmental interference with
property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of oth-
erwise proper interference amounting to a taking.24 9
In other words, the Court recognized that the just compensation clause does
not describe the outer limits of validity for police power regulations. Rather, it
exists to secure compensation when a valid regulatory interference with prop-
erty rights has an effect so severe as to amount to a taking.
The Court also indicated that a valid police power regulation can take
when it noted the options available to the government once a court has found
242. Id.
243. Id. at 2385.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Callies, supra note 54, at 53.
246. See supra notes 146-59 and accompanying text (discussion of Brennan's
opinion); see infra notes 260-71 and accompanying text (discussion of Rehnquist's
opinion).
247. 107 S. Ct. at 2386 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922)).
248. Id. at 2387.
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that a regulatory taking has occurred.2 50 The First English opinion distin-
guished "amendment of the regulation" and "withdrawal of the invalidated
regulation."'25' It thus recognized that a regulation which works a taking can
be either valid or invalid as an exercise of the police power.
Justice Brennan's San Diego Gas opinion 2 2 had explicitly found that a
valid police power regulation can also work a compensable taking.25 3 For
Brennan, this conclusion was compelled by logic as well as by clear Supreme
Court precedent. 25 ' The majority of federal appellate courts and state supreme
courts had subsequently followed the Brennan doctrine.2
55
Unfortunately, the Rehnquist opinion in First English not only failed to
acknowledge the trend which had developed in the lower courts, and failed to
address the police power question head on as Justice Brennan had done,2 8 but
also appeared to back off from the Brennan position in two respects.
Because of the procedural posture of the case, the lower courts had as-
sumed the truth of the church's allegation that the regulation deprived it of all
use of Lutherglen.2 57 Chief Justice Rehnquist announced that the Court ac-
cordingly had
no occasion to decide whether the ordinance at issue actually denied appellant
all use of its property or whether the county might avoid the conclusion that a
compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the denial of all use
was insulated as part of the State's authority to enact safety regulations. 258
Given the procedural posture under which First English reached the
Court, the majority may well have felt compelled to leave direct resolution of
the police power question for another day. However, Rehnquist's failure to at
least address the subject seems remarkable in light of the fact that he had
agreed with the merits of Brennan's San Diego Gas opinion,259 and the fact
that he cited that opinion three times in First English.280 Brennan's opinion
was founded on the idea that the Mahon court conclusively "rejected the pro-
position that police power restrictions could never be recognized as Fifth
Amendment 'taking[s].' "21 Furthermore, the Chief Justice failed to mention
that the first case he cited as authority for the proposition that a safety regula-
250. Id. at 2389.
251. Id. (emphasis added).
252. See supra notes 142-73 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
254. Id.
255. See supra notes 176-94 and accompanying text.
256. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 647-53
(1981).
257. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378, 2384-85 (1987).
258. Id.
259. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 621, 633.
260. 107 S. Ct. at 2386 & n.9, 2388.
261. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 650 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tion might be insulated from causing a taking, Goldblatt v. Hempstead,262 also
recognized as incorrect the view that "governmental action in the form of reg-
ulation cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitutionally
requires compensation. '263 The manner in which Rehnquist phrased the deci-
sion not to reach this issue, coupled with his citation of Mugler2 " but not
Mahon265 in this connection,2 66 is already leading regulation advocates to ar-
gue that compensation is never required for the effect of a valid police power
regulation. 267 It seems unfortunate that this portion of the opinion should have
been written in a way that can lend itself to undercutting of the basic thrust of
the opinion as a whole.
268
The second respect in which Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to back off
from the Brennan position on the police power takings question is even more
unfortunate. As Justice Brennan defined it, a regulatory taking occurs "where
the effects completely deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the
property. '26 9 In First English, Chief Justice Rehnquist phrased the Court's
holding as follows: "We merely hold that where the government's activities
have already worked a taking of all use of property .... Here we must as-
sume that the Los Angeles County ordinances have denied appellant all use of
its property for a considerable period of years .... ,,27o It takes no great imagi-
nation to foresee the use to which lawyers representing regulators will put this
262. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
263. Id. at 594.
264. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
265. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
266. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378, 2385 (1987). For a persuasive demonstration that the principles of Mugler
and Mahon are not really contradictory, and that the police and eminent domain pow-
ers are correctly viewed as occupying the same continuum of government power on
which they can and do overlap, see Bauman, supra note 31, at 49-53.
267. See, e.g., Weidenbach, supra note 70, at 6. Chief Justice Rehnquist did
limit his remark to the question of whether a safety regulation could be "insulated"
from working a taking. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2385. Whether future decisions will
differentiate safety regulations, which do not "take," from other police power regula-
tions, which may, remains to be seen. For a recent suggestion that the Court may be
moving toward a distinction between "harm prevention" regulations, which do not take,
and "amenity preservation" regulations, which might take, see R. Freilich, Planning
and Zoning Case Law Overview with Emphasis on Recent Supreme Court Decisions:
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Evangelical Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, The 'Regulatory Taking' Cases, Presentation to University of
Missouri-Columbia Continuing Legal Education Seminar, Kansas City, Missouri
(Sept. 25, 1987) (written outline available in Office of CLE, University of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law).
268. If no valid police power regulation can also "take," the First English rule
that compensation is required for regulatory takings will be of largely precatory effect,
provided that validity continues to be measured by a deferential, rational-basis
standard.
269. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 450
U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (emphasis added).
270. First English, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987) (emphasis added).
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omission of the words "or most." In this respect, First English could in fact
unsettle an aspect of the takings question which was well on the way to being
settled by lower federal and state supreme court decisions using the Brennan
formula.21 1
Given the level of controversy over the takings question, the consequential
nature of the issues, and the need for definitive guidance from the Supreme
Court, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that, at least as regards this aspect of
the opinion, the Court would have done better to adopt Justice Brennan's San
Diego Gas opinion verbatim, rather than at second-hand.
B. The Compensation Question
To the question of whether monetary damages are available as a remedy
for a regulatory taking, the First English Court gave a definitive, categorical,
and unequivocal answer. It held that compensation is the constitutionally re-
quired remedy for all regulatory takings.27 2
In affirming that compensation is the constitutionally required remedy for
regulatory takings, the Court directly addressed the contrary view expressed in
Agins I and argued by pro-regulatory commentators, and found that view to
be constitutionally erroneous. Agins I had declared that a compensation rem-
edy is not available for temporary regulatory takings, and therefore landown-
ers may seek only invalidation of a regulation. Having finally reached the
question of the correctness of the Agins I rule after four abortive attempts, the
Court declared that "the California courts have decided the compensation
question inconsistently with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. 2 7 3
Agins I is therefore necessarily overruled, and the view it espoused is no longer
tenable.
The Court declared that the express language of the fifth amendment in
the just compensation clause requires compensation for temporary regulatory
takings.2 74 Since the purpose of the clause is "to secure compensation in the
271. See supra notes 174-94 and accompanying text.
272. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389. It is worth noting in this regard that the
majority opinion in First English was written by the Chief Justice, and that the six-
member majority included Justices commonly considered to be liberals (Brennan, Mar-
shall), conservatives (Rehnquist, Scalia), and moderates (Powell, White). Id. at 2381.
The result in First English had been predicted by some commentators. See, e.g.,
Deutsch, supra note 28, § 1.02(1)(b); Bauman, A True Landmark Decision, 39 LAND
USE & ZONING DIG. No. 8, at 3 (Aug. 1987). According to Bauman, the makeup of
the majority was predictable given a careful reading of the opinions in Hamilton Bank,
MacDonald and Keystone Bituminous, coupled with close attention to the shifts in
voting in those cases - the key was convincing Brennan and White to vote together.
Bauman, supra, at 3. This holding obviously means that when First English reaches
the California Court of Appeal on remand, the allegation that the regulation took all
use of Lutherglen must be reinstated.
273. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2383.
274. Id. at 2385.
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event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking,"27 5 it follows
that "government action that works a taking of property rights necessarily
implicates the 'constitutional obligation to pay just compensation.' "276
Furthermore, a property owner affected by a regulatory taking has the
right to bring an inverse condemnation action and thus seek the compensation
remedy. First English reaffirmed the established doctrine that the just com-
pensation clause is self-executing. As the Court put it, "We have recognized
that a landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemnation as a
result of 'the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with re-
spect to compensation.. . .' In the event of a taking, the compensation remedy
is required by the Constitution. 27 7
The Court concluded that invalidation alone is not a constitutionally suffi-
cient remedy for a regulatory taking.278 This is true even where invalidation
converts the regulatory taking into a temporary one. The Constitution requires
compensation for all takings, permanent or temporary.27 The Court noted
that many of its earlier cases had required compensation for temporary physi-
cal appropriation or use of property by the government.280 In the Court's view,
these cases established the principle that "'temporary' takings which, as here,
[i.e., temporary regulatory takings] deny a landowner all use of his property,
are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution
clearly requires compensation."'281 Therefore, the Court asserted, "invalidation
of the ordinance or its successor ordinance after this period of time, though
converting the taking into a 'temporary' one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet
the demands of the Just Compensation Clause. '282
The First English majority observed that when a court finds that a regu-
lation has worked a taking, the government has the option of "amendment of
the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or the exercise of em-
inent domain. '283 Thus, the property owner may not demand that the govern-
ment keep what the regulation has taken and pay the compensation due for a
permanent taking, merely because a regulation has already affected a taking
of his property.284 However, the Court said, where the regulation has "already
worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the govern-
275. Id. at 2386 (emphasis in original).
276. Id. at 2386 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))
(emphasis added).
277. Id. (citations omitted).
278. Id. at 2388.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 2387-88.
281. Id. at 2388 (emphasis added). This principle was enunciated, the First Eng-
lish opinion noted, in Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas.
282. Id. The period of time between the date the regulation in First English
went into effect and the date of the final state court disposition of the regulatory taking
claim, which is the period referred to by the Court, was six years and seven months. Id.




Taylor: Taylor: He Who Calls the Tune
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
106 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
ment [i.e., not even amendment of a still-valid regulation or withdrawal of an
invalidated regulation] can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for
the period during which the taking was effective."285 This is consistent, the
Court noted, with the established rule that compensation is required for tem-
porary physical takings by the government. 8
C. The Timing Question
The First English opinion also provided an answer to the question of
when a regulation works a taking. This question involves determination of
when a regulatory taking begins, and of the effect caused when such a taking
ends.287 The First English Court definitively settled questions concerning the
impact of the end of a regulatory taking when it held that "no subsequent
action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation
for the period during which the taking was effective."288 However, it addressed
the determination of when a regulatory taking begins in a somewhat indirect
and ambiguous fashion.8 9 This issue is probably not entirely settled; the ambi-
guity of the answer may lead to further litigation.
The First English rule is that compensation must be paid for the period
of time during which a regulatory taking exists prior to abandonment of the
regulation by the government.2 " While this rule does not of itself settle ex-
actly when such a period begins, First English does establish, at least by im-
plication, some criteria by which the beginning point can be determined.
The government defendants in First English had argued that no taking
existed before a court invalidated the regulation; that is, before a court de-
clared that a taking existed.2 91 They based their argument on the Court's ear-
lier decisions in Danforth v. United States292 and Agins 11,293 which had said
that fluctuations in property value resulting from adoption of regulations were
"incidents of ownership" rather than regulatory takings. 94 The First English
Court, however, plainly took the view that regulations do not necessarily begin
to deny use of property only when a court rules that they have that effect. As
the Court observed, "It would require a considerable extension of these deci-
sions [Danforth and Agins II] to say that no compensable regulatory taking
may occur until a challenged ordinance has ultimately been held invalid. ' '295
The Court found that, on the contrary, "the interference that effects a taking
285. Id.
286. Id. at 2387.
287. See supra notes 226-39 and accompanying text.
288. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
289. See infra notes 290-312 and accompanying text.
290. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2387-89.
291. Id. at 2388.
292. 308 U.S. 271 (1939).
293. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
294. Danforth, 308 U.S. at 285; Agins II, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9.
295. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
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might begin much earlier, and compensation is measured from that time.' '2
Danforth and Agins II, the Court said, "merely stand for the unexceptional
proposition that the valuation of property which has been taken must be calcu-
lated as of the time of the taking, and that depreciation in value of the prop-
erty by reason of preliminary activity is not chargeable to the government. 29 7
Although the First English Court did not explicitly define the distinction
between preliminary activity and the beginning of a regulatory taking, it im-
plied that one major element in the distinction is time. It did so by discussing
temporal matters as affecting the determination of a taking.
The Court distinguished the factual situation in First English from "nor-
mal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, vari-
ances, and the like which are not before us."2 98 Even after First English,
therefore, it remains true that where a regulation affects a property owner's
interests only during the "normal delay" involved in seeking a permit, amend-
ment, or variance, a taking does not begin. Compensation for depreciation in
the property's value caused by such delays "is not chargeable to the
government. '29
9
However, in First English the plaintiff had been deprived of use of its
296. Id. at 2389 n.10. The Court indicated that this directive is distinct from the
ripeness requirement that makes a denial of compensation by the government a prereq-
uisite to legal action. Id. While ripeness requires finality, including denial of applica-
tions for variances, etc., Hamilton Bank "did not establish that compensation is un-
available for government activity occurring before compensation is actually denied.
Though, as a matter of law, an illegitimate taking might not occur until the govern-
ment refuses to pay, the interference that effects a taking might begin much earlier,
and compensation is measured from that time." Id.
When analyzed, footnote 10 appears to mean the following: A regulatory taking
begins when the interference by the regulation with the owner's property rights begins.
If matters are not resolved prior to judicial determination that the regulation worked a
taking, the calculation of what compensation is due dates from the beginning of the
interference. However, that judicial determination cannot take place until after the
property owner has used available compensation-providing procedures short of an in-
verse condemnation claim in court. Use of such procedures, if available, is required by
the doctrine of ripeness for judicial review, one purpose of which is to prevent waste of
judicial resources. This was the requirement discussed in Williamson Regional Plan-
ning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 & n.13 (1985), the source cited by
Justice Rehnquist in footnote 10. It appears to be what was meant by the statement
that "an illegitimate taking might not occur until the government refuses to pay," 107
S. Ct. at 2389 n.10, which might have been better worded as "an illegitimate taking
may not be judicially determinable prior to government refusal to pay."
Some commentators had predicted that the ripeness and exhaustion requirements
set out in Hamilton Bank and MacDonald would lead the Court to set the beginning
point for regulatory takings at the time a final decision is rendered, rather than the
time when the regulation is enacted. See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 21, § 1.02(l)(b).
This prediction proved to be incorrect.
297. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388.
298. Id. at 2389 (emphasis added).
299. Id. at 2388.
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property for six and one-half years.3 00 Earlier temporary taking cases involving
leasehold interests had required compensation for shorter periods. 01 The
Court referred repeatedly to this "considerable period of years,"302 and held
that invalidation without compensation for "this period of time" would be con-
stitutionally insufficient.303 The implication that duration is a factor in finding
a regulatory taking is plain. It should be remembered, however, that the First
English Court cited Agins II as an example of preliminary activity which was
not a taking; and the comparable period of time involved in that case was also
approximately six years.'" Simple numerical calculation, it seems, does not
provide a mechanical answer to the timing question.
The First English Court also implied that a second major element in the
distinction between preliminary activity and the beginning of a regulatory tak-
ing is fairness. The Court began its entire discussion of the timing question by
reasserting the established doctrine that "the Fifth Amendment's just compen-
sation provision is 'designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.9305
Given (1) the emphasis in Hamilton Bank on requiring a landowner to
seek variances or changes in the regulation in order to produce the "final"
government decision on how the regulation applies to the property which is
prerequisite to suit,306 (2) the discussion in First English concerning "normal
delays" and "fairness," 3° and (3) the assertion in First English that a regula-
tory taking may occur as early as the effective date of the regulation,308 it
appears that the First English answer to the timing question is threefold. One,
a regulatory taking begins when the challenged regulation begins to affect the
property.309 Two, this occurs when, without unfair delay,310 the regulating
body makes a final decision as to the regulation's particular effect on the prop-
erty, including disposition of requests for variances. It does not occur only
300. Id. ("[T]he interim ordinance was adopted ... in January 1979, and be-
came effective immediately. Applicant filed suit within a month ... and yet when the
Supreme Court of California denied a hearing in the case on October 17, 1985, the
merits of appellant's claim had yet to be determined." Id.).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 2389.
303. Id.
304. The ordinance in question in Agins I and Agins II was adopted in June,
1973, and the California Supreme Court ruled in March, 1979. Agins I, 25 Cal. 3d
266, 271, 598 P.2d 25, 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 374 (1979). The Supreme Court ruled
in June, 1980. Agins II, 447 U.S. 255, 255 (1980).
305. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
306. Id. at 2389 n.10.
307. Id. at 2388-89.
308. Id. at 2389 n.10.
309. Id.
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when a court rules that the regulation worked a taking. 1' Three, what consti-
tutes "normal delay" versus what is "unfair" is a question of fact, which must
be determined separately in each case.3" 2
IV. THE IMPACT OF First English ON LAND USE REGULATION
Assessment of the Court's decision in First English must include consid-
eration of its potential impact on land use regulation law. Both the majority
and dissenting opinions addressed this issue.31 3 The dissent predicted that the
Court's ruling would have dire consequences for land use regulation.3"" The
majority acknowledged that the decision might have a material impact on land
use planning and regulation,3 15 but concluded that such potential consequences
were outweighed by two fundamental principles: fairness, 316 and protection of
constitutional rights.31
A. Predicted Consequences
The dissent" 8 and some initial reports of the case319 predicted three ma-
311. Id. at 2566.
312. Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas also asserted that compensation
is to be measured from the effective date of a regulation. 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). It can be argued that the First English majority opinion
tacitly incorporates the Brennan opinion. The incorporation argument derives from the
fact that the majority opinion in First English refers to Justice Brennan's San Diego
Gas dissent with approval three times - at 107 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 and 2388 - as well
as from the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in San Diego Gas indi-
cated his fundamental agreement with the substance of Justice Brennan's opinion re-
garding the merits. See 450 U.S. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The thesis
would also find support in the widespread lower court adoption of the Brennan dissent
position. See supra notes 150-65 and accompanying text.
313. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389-90.
314. Id. at 2389-90, 2399-2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at 2389.
316. Id. at 2388.
317. Id. at 2389.
318. Justice Stevens wrote the single dissenting opinion in First English. He
made four major points and three predictions. Justices Blackmun and O'Conner joined
in two parts of the Stevens opinion. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens' other
arguments swayed no vote but his own. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since the vote in
First English was 6-3, all of the positions taken by the dissent have been rejected by a
substantial majority of the Court, and some have been rebuffed by an overwhelming
majority.
Stevens, Blackmun, and O'Connor would have "summarily rejected on its merits"
the church's claim that the regulation was a taking of Lutherglen, 107 S. Ct. at 2393,
because they believed that a safety ordinance "cannot constitute a taking." Id. at 2391-
92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens cited the Mugler line of cases for the premise that
a regulation which is a valid exercise of the police power cannot require compensation,
at least when its objective relates to health and safety, since it falls within the noxious
use area. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally supra notes 219-20 and accompa-
nying text. He cited Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and
19881
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the Police Power, 52 TEx. L. REV. 201 (1974), as placing flood plain regulations within
this area. Plater, however, cites a number of cases holding otherwise. See id. at 227.
The view of the majority Justices was that the Court need not decide "whether the
county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by estab-
lishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's authority to
enact safety regulations." First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85.
Stevens was also joined by Blackmun and O'Connor in arguing that the Court
should have found the church's claim unripe for judicial review because it had not
sought invalidation of the regulation. Id. at 2396-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Ste-
vens' view, the California courts had not declared that damages were never available
for the portion of a regulatory taking which preceded a judicial ruling. Id. Rather, he
argued, they had stricken the damages claim in First English because it was not cou-
pled with a request for declaratory relief in the form of invalidation. Stevens contended
that this could be a valid state procedural requirement. Id. This view of Agins I seems
insupportable. The California Supreme Court had plainly declared that "although a
landowner... may challenge both the constitutionality of the ordinance and the man-
ner in which it is applied to his property by seeking to establish the invalidity of the
ordinance either through the remedy of declaratory relief or mandamus, he may not
recover damages on the theory of inverse condemnation." Agins I, 24 Cal. 3d 266,
269-70, 598 P.2d 25, 26, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 373 (1979) (emphasis added).
Although no other Justice agreed, Stevens advanced the proposition that a regula-
tion could only amount to a taking if its effect was nearly permanent. Stevens argued
that the Diminution of Value Test, see supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text,
should include not only "the extent to which the owner may not use the property," and
"the amount of property encompassed by the restrictions," but also "the duration of
the restrictions." First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the
temporary effect of a regulation to effect a taking, "the restriction on the use of the
property would not only have to be a substantial one, but it would have to remain in
effect for a significant percentage of the property's useful life." Id. (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Since the useful life of land is virtually always longer than the useful life of
landowners, it appears that such a rule effectively would end individual property rights.
In support of his argument, Stevens made the assumption that "if the sovereign chooses
not to retain the regulation, repeal will, in virtually all cases, mitigate the overall effect
of the regulation so substantially that the slight diminution in value that the regulation
caused while in effect cannot be classified as a taking of property." Id. at 2393. This
assumption seems suspect on empirical grounds. See supra notes 52-53 and accompa-
nying text.
Stevens was also alone in advancing the theory that "it is the Due Process Clause
rather than [the Just Compensation Clause, as interpreted by Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon] that protects the property owner from improperly motivated, unfairly con-
ducted, or unnecessarily protracted governmental decisionmaking" in the context of
regulations. 107 S. Ct. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens candidly stated his
belief that even this protection should rarely be available. "I am convinced that the
public interest in having important governmental decisions made in an orderly, fully
informed way amply justifies the temporary burden on the citizen that is the inevitable
by-product of democratic government." Id. "We must presume that regulatory bodies.
. . generally make a good-faith effort to advance the public interest when they are
performing their official duties . . . ." Id. (quoting Williamson County Regional Plan-
ning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 205 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
This latter presumption is contradicted by even the most openly pro-regulation schol-
ars. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
Stevens' predictions (paraphrased freely) were that the sky would fall if compensa-
tion became available for regulatory takings. His opinion began by forecasting that the
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jor consequences of the decision: a flood of litigation,3 20 a potentially ruinous
financial impact on government regulatory bodies, 32' and a chilling effect on
land use planning and regulation.3 22 These predictions overstate the likely re-
sults of First English.3
23
majority opinion was certain to "generate a great deal of litigation," and that "the
mere duty to defend the actions that today's decision will spawn will undoubtedly have
a significant adverse impact on the land-use regulatory process." 107 S. Ct. at 2389-90
(Stevens, J., dissenting). It ended with similar prophecies: "Cautious local officials and
land-use planners may avoid taking any action that might later be challenged and thus
give rise to a damage action. Much important regulation will never be enacted, even
perhaps in the health and safety area." Id. at 2399-2400. These predictions seem un-
likely. See infra notes 325-55 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
320. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
321. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
322. 107 S. Ct. at 2399-400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
323. One other potential consequence, or non-consequence, of the First English
decision also deserves mention. It is possible that First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale may not benefit from the First English rule, since the church may
not receive compensation for the effect on Lutherglen of the ban on building in the
floodplain. As discussed supra at notes 241-45, 258-68 and accompanying text, the
Court did not decide either (1) whether the regulation "took" Lutherglen by depriving
the church of all use of the property, or (2) whether "the denial of all use was insulated
as a part of the State's authority to enact safety regulations." 107 S. Ct. at 2384-85.
Those questions, the Court said, remain open on remand. Id. Pro-regulation commenta-
tors are already arguing that the rule is unlikely to apply because of the safety ration-
ale for the regulation. Weidenbach, supra note 70, at 8.
The question of whether floodplain regulations can work a compensable taking is
not clearly settled. Cases which have considered the issue are collected in Annotation,
Local Use Zoning Of Wetlands Or Flood Plain As Taking Without Compensation, 19
A.L.R. 4TH 756 (1983 & Supp. 1987). In the first flood plain zoning case, Dooley v.
Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964), the Connecti-
cut high court declared the regulation unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 311-12, 197
A.2d at 773-74. More recent cases have been more receptive to flood plain zoning, but
have noted in upholding regulations that the landowners involved were not deprived of
all beneficial use of their property. See Hope, Various Aspects of Flood Plain Zoning,
55 N.D.L. REV. 429, 432-34, 438 (1979); see also Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natu-
ral Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 52 TEx. L. REV. 201, 227 (1974).
All of the cases cited by the Annotation predate First English. The rule on com-
pensation for regulatory takings will now be different for states such as California,
which previously banned compensation for regulatory takings. See Agins I, 24 Cal. 3d
266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979). California courts have previously held
that flood plain regulations did not constitute governmental takings, but have noted in
doing so that the regulations allowed some beneficial use of the property. See Helix
Land Co. v. San Diego, 82 Cal. App. 3d 932, 147 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1978); Turner v.
County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972). In First English,
it may turn out to be important that the county claimed that some development could
be allowed on the church's property, since the county has a list of allowed floodplain
uses. Deutsch, supra note 21, § 1.02(1)(b).
Scholars have argued that some regulations banning development in a flood plain
may be unjustified by the police power due to lack of a legitimate public purpose. This
is so, it is argued, because flood protection works and flood relief are a normal obliga-
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Several aspects of regulatory takings law, embodied in precedents left un-
tion of government, which governmental bodies should not be able to avoid merely by
banning development which might be flooded. See Dunham, Flood Control Via the
Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1098, 1125-27 (1959).
The issue of whether a safety regulation can ever work a compensable taking is
likely to be hotly contested in the remand proceedings. It is by no means unimaginable
that the case could again reach the Supreme Court. If it does so, it may be affected by
what some commentators see as a developing Supreme Court trend toward a stiffer
level of judicial scrutiny of legislative actions in the land use regulation area.
[U]nder the guise of equal protection, the Court is taking a closer look at
economic and social legislation, including land-use regulation. Generally, the
Supreme Court has in modern times eschewed second guessing state and local
legislators, holding that absent some basis for strict scrutiny, their actions
pass the equal protection test if they have a "rational basis." In practice, this
has meant it is virtually impossible to overturn a state or local enactment on
the ground that it lacks a rational basis....
Starting in the early 1980s, however, the Court began to reassert its
oversight of social and economic legislation that seemed beyond challenge
only a few years earlier. Suddenly new life [has been] breathed into the ra-
tionality test ....
Duerksen & Bean, Land and the Law 1986: The Perils of Prognostication, 18 URB.
LAW. 947, 953-54 (1986). For a summary of this trend, see Bosselman, Overview of
Recent Decisions, ALI-ABA INSTTuTE, Aug. 13, 1985.
The argument that the rational-basis hurdle has been raised in the land use con-
text was markedly strengthened by the Court's decision in Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), handed down less than a month after First English.
In Nollan, the Court found that an exaction by the government of an easement for
public passage along a private stretch of ocean beach, in return for permission to build
a larger house, was not rationally related to the stated government objective of preserv-
ing the public view of the beach from further inland. Id. at 3148.
The Nollan Court said that a regulation "does not effect a taking if it 'substan-
tially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically
viable use of his land.'" 107 S. Ct. at 3146 (quoting Agins I, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980)) (citations omitted). Significantly, the Court said it was not established that
these standards were "the same as those applied to due process or equal-protection
claims." Id. at 3147 n.3. On the contrary, the Court asserted, in the takings field the
standards are different. "We have required that the regulation must 'substantially ad-
vance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved." Id. (quoting Agins II, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980)) (emphasis added). The standard is not, the Court stated,
whether "the State 'could rationally have decided' the measure adopted might achieve
the State's objective." Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 466 (1981)) (emphasis in original).
[O]ur cases describe the condition for abridgement of property rights through
the police power as a "substantial advanc[ing]" of a legitimate State interest.
We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective where the ac-
tual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a land use
restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is
avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police
power objective.
Id. at 3150 (emphasis in original).
If the Court is in fact applying a heightened level of scrutiny in land use regula-
tion cases, as Nollan seems to indicate, the significance of First English is likely to be
increased. The combination of heightened scrutiny and availability of a compensation
[Vol. 53
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changed by First English, suggest that an inundation of the courts by inverse
condemnation claims in temporary regulatory taking cases may be unlikely.
First, the finality requirement which the Supreme Court has made part of the
definition of ripeness for judicial review in regulatory takings cases still consti-
tutes a major hurdle for inverse condemnation claims to overcome.
In Hamilton Bank3 2 ' and MacDonald3 23 the Court made it clear that a
property owner must obtain a final decision by the regulating agency concern-
ing the application of the regulation to the property before a regulatory tak-
ings case is ripe for judicial review. Obtaining this final decision requires sub-
mission of at least some revised development plans, and application for
variances or other changes in the regulation.3 26 As commentators on Hamilton
Bank had already observed, this finality requirement plainly "takes some of
the potential sting out of damage actions being used as a weapon to coerce
recalcitrant local governments. 3 27 While the finality requirement has been
criticized by some scholars, 3 2 the cases which establish it were not overruled
by First English.
Under First English, the regulatory body will have to keep in mind that
compensation might be calculated from the date the regulation affected the
property if a court finds that the regulation worked a taking.329 However, be-
cause the property owner must meet the finality requirement before he can
sue, the government will have an opportunity to avoid financial liability
through the choices it makes in the process of considering amended develop-
ment plans, variance applications, etc. It need not fear that by merely enacting
a regulation it has touched a financial "tar baby" it cannot shake off. The fact
that a landowner might ultimately win compensation for a regulatory taking in
court may create a more even balance of power in negotiations between owner
remedy could prove more potent than a compensation remedy alone. Indeed, pugilistic
analogies to a "one-two punch" seem likely to grace future scholarship on the question.
The level of scrutiny eventually applied also may affect the issue of whether the regula-
tion in First English is shielded from working a taking by its police power rationale as
a safety measure.
324. Williamson Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985).
325. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
326. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. at 188-93; MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2567-68.
327. Duerksen & Bean, Land and the Law 1986: The Perils of Prognostication,
18 URB. LAw. 947, 948 (1986); see also Morgan, supra note 119, at ch. 9.
328. See, e.g., Deutsch, supra note 21, § 1.02(1)(b) ("The Court is attempting to
apply concepts of finality that make sense only in a formal administrative decisionmak-
ing process. However, local land use decisionmaking rarely matches that formal model.
... Usually... the developer and the local government are involved in a bargaining
process which ultimately leads to permission to develop some project, albeit modified,
that is economically acceptable to the developer. Especially when a long-term develop-
ment plan is proposed ... there is a likelihood that the development will be modified
over time.").
329. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378, 2389 n.10 (1987).
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and regulator. However, because owners must go through the process man-
dated by the finality requirement, and because subsequent litigation would
have high financial and temporal costs, owners will normally prefer to obtain
the relief they seek through negotiation. Thus, a major increase in litigation
resulting from First English seems unlikely. It could even be argued that the
ultimate threat of financial liability may produce more negotiation compro-
mise by regulators, and thus actually cause some decrease in litigation.
Second, once the finality requirement is met, the abstention doctrine may
suggest that a final outcome from state litigation is also prerequisite to federal
litigation. Hamilton Bank pronounced the seeking of compensation through
available state procedures to be a further precondition of ripeness for federal
judicial review, and thus appears to establish such a requirement.330 The sig-
nificance of this prerequisite has been heightened by First English. Whereas
formerly only some states provided a compensation remedy, now all must do
so, because the Supreme Court declared such a remedy to be constitutionally
required.33 1 If all landowners seeking access to federal court must first face the
time and money costs of state litigation, any putative litigational deluge should
be further deterred.
Third, in either state or federal litigation, the burden of proving a regula-
tory taking will still lie with the property owner, and the presumption of legis-
lative validity with the government. This burden will in many cases remain
difficult to meet. Judicial determination that a regulatory taking has occurred
is still prerequisite to compensation, and recent decisions imply that if the reg-
ulation leaves the property owner with some valuable use of the property, a
regulatory taking will not be found.332 This prospect also seems likely to miti-
gate against a great increase in litigation.
Those predicting a negative financial impact on regulatory bodies do so to
support what has been called the "risk to the fisc" argument.33 3 They assert
that the potential for government financial ruin supposedly inherent in a com-
pensation remedy is so ominous that it constitutes a policy reason for a judicial
finding that compensation is not available for regulatory takings.3 34
330. Williamson Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
194, 194 n.13, 195 (1985) ("[1]f a state provides an adequate procedure for seekingjust compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause until it [sic] has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.").
Prior to Hamilton Bank, the federal courts were split on whether abstention was
required in regulatory taking cases. See Berger & Kanner, supra note 33, at 694
nn.38-40 (citation of cases preferring or refusing abstention between 1967 and 1984).
331. See supra notes 372-86 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 135(1978) (where some economically viable use remained, regulation of air rights did not
work a taking); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653(1981) (regulatory taking exists where the effects of the regulation "completely deprive
the owner of all or most of his interest in the property").
333. Berger & Kanner, supra note 33, at 749.
334. See Agins 1, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
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One problem with the argument is that many of its proponents try to have
things both ways, as they also argue that the damage done to individual prop-
erty owners by regulatory takings is so minimal that the impact of a regulation
cannot amount to a constitutionally prohibited taking. If regulating entities
now face enormous and potentially ruinous judgments, individual property
owners must have been suffering catastrophic losses and major deprivations of
their constitutional rights prior to First English. If, on the other hand, the
impact of regulations approaches the minimal, then regulating entities should
face insignificant financial consequences when compelled to compensate those
minimal damages. 3 5
This prediction, often couched in apocalyptic terms,3 3 6 probably belongs
in the category of "crying Wolf." As some scholars have noted, such forecasts
have proved false before.3 3 7 For example, when state and local governments
were trying to preserve the tort sovereign immunity doctrine, similar prophe-
cies were made.3 8 Yet general abandonment of the doctrine by state courts
did not result in the predicted fiscal disaster.33 9
Another reason to greet the prediction of financial calamity with some
skepticism is that the question of whether the compensation required for a
regulatory taking must be monetary or whether it might take other forms ap-
pears undecided. In MacDonald,M 0 the Court set out a two-prong test for tak-
ings claims, the second prong of which asks whether "any proffered compensa-
tion is not just,"341 and cited Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York ' with approval in the course of discussing such "proffered" compensa-
tion. 34 3 Since the Court in Penn Central recognized the state's provision of
transferred development rights as adequate compensation,3 " it appears that
such compensation, at least in appropriate circumstances, might be found to
satisfy the just compensation clause.M5 One commentator has observed that
this could be "an enormous relief to communities that have been found to have
carried out a regulatory taking," since such a community might be allowed to
"avoid having to pay monetary compensation by putting together a package of
335. This contradiction in the "risk to the fisc" argument is pointed out in Ber-
ger & Kanner, supra note 33, at 743-45.
336. See, e.g., The White River Junction Manifesto, supra note 36, at 240
("Widespread adoption of [a compensation remedy] would be a disaster - quite possi-
bly, a disaster of unimaginable proportions.").
337. See, e.g., Comment, Just Compensation, supra note 33, at 726-27.
338. Id.
339. Id.; see also Berger, The State's Police Power Is Not (Yet) the Power of a
Police State: A Reply to Professor Girard, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., May, 1983,
at 4, 8.
340. MacDonald, Summer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
341. Id. at 2566.
342. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
343. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2567 (dictum).
344. 438 U.S. at 112-15.
345. See Deutsch, supra note 21, § 1.02(1)(b).
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benefits which, while sometimes less desirable from a planning viewpoint, may
save the communit[y] from the bankruptcy some commentators have
feared." 3 6
The prediction that planning and regulation will be inhibited derives from
the "risk to the fisc" argument noted above. In the words of the First English
dissent, "Cautious local officials and land-use planners may avoid taking any
action that might later be challenged and thus give rise to a damage action.
Much important regulation will never be enacted, even perhaps in the health
and safety area."1- '7
As Justice Brennan noted in response to the same argument in San Diego
Gas, "one may wonder as an empirical matter whether the threat of just com-
pensation will greatly impede the efforts of planners. 34 8 Commentators have
also noted a lack of empirical support for the prediction.34 9 The Supreme
Court has already discounted it in the context of municipal tort immunity.
"[A]s an empirical matter, it is questionable whether the hazard of municipal
loss will deter a public officer from the conscientious exercise of his duties; city
officials routinely make decisions that either require a large expenditure of
municipal funds or involve a substantial risk of depleting the public fisc." 350
The injection of economic realism into the regulatory process should be
welcomed rather than feared. The costs imposed by regulations cannot be
avoided. As scholars have observed, the question is not whether these costs will
be paid but rather who will pay them.351 One commentator has noted that
regulatory bodies lack an "incentive to seek the most efficient means to
achieve public goals when they know they will not be forced to pay for even
346. Id. For a general discussion of transferable development rights and their
potential satisfaction of the compensation requirement, compare Costonis, Fair Com-
pensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land
Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975) with Berger, The Accommodation
Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
799 (1976).
347. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378, 2399-400 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Sallet, Regulatory
"Takings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme Court's Search for a Solution Con-
tinues, supra note 33, at 636 ("The possibility that large monetary damages may be
awarded to landowners for the period of time prior to a final judicial determination of
the constitutionality of a land use regulation is likely to deter local governments from
engaging in useful and constitutionally proper activities.").
348. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26
(1981).
349. See Berger, supra note 339, at 8; Comment, Just Compensation, supra note
33, at 730.
350. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 656 (1980).
351. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Searchfor Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970); Michelman, Property
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1967); see also Blume & Rubinfeld, Compensa-
tion for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569 (1984).
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the most excessive regulations. A compensation remedy can be the catalyst
which facilitates careful assessment of the actual social cost of a regulatory
act .. .
Furthermore, it is by no means established that less regulation would be
an outcome to be deprecated. A growing number of reputable scholars in the
field are suggesting that we would be better off, both environmentally and
economically, without the current system of land use regulation. 53
In any case, the Supreme Court has already declared that consideration
of issues of constitutional rights and governmental liability is part of the duty
of government officials. In the Court's words:
More important, though, is the realization that consideration of the munici-
pality's liability for constitutional violations is quite properly the concern of
its elected or appointed officials. Indeed, a decisionmaker would be derelict in
his duties if, at some point, he did not consider whether his decision comports
with constitutional mandates and did not weigh the risk that a violation might
result in an award of damages from the public treasury."'
As Justice Brennan summed up this point in San Diego Gas, "After all, if a
policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a planner?"35 5
B. Fundamental Principles
In the long run, the most lasting legacy of the First English decision may
be the Court's insistence that land use regulation law must not ignore two
paramount, fundamental principles. Its emphasis on fairness and protection of
constitutional rights provides jurisprudential foundations on which future reg-
ulatory takings cases seem likely to build.
Clearly, the economic cost of restrictions on land use is inevitably paid by
someone. 5 6 Just as clearly, the public good demands some reasonable restric-
352. Comment, Just Compensation, supra note 33, at 731-32. As some commen-
tators have observed, the argument that regulation will be inhibited by allowing a com-
pensation remedy at bottom involves a distrust of democracy: those favoring regulation
fear that if government were required to pay for the benefits obtained through land use
regulations, local regulators would be unable to convince the voters to put up the
money. See Berger & Kanner, supra note 33, at 747-48.
353. See, e.g., Delogu, supra note 51, at 261; Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An
Alternative Free Enterprise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28 (1981); Pul-
liam, Brandeis Brief for Decontrol of Land Use: A Plea for Constitutional Reform, 13
Sw. U.L. REV. 435 (1983).
354. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 656 (1980) (emphasis in
original).
355. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26
(1981).
356. The objective of land use regulations which prevent virtually all use of prop-
erty, zoning for open space use only, for example, has too often been acquisition of a
"free lunch" by in effect taking private property for public use without cost to the
public. The Supreme Court observed long ago that property is held subject to a duty
not to use it to create a nuisance which threatens public health or safety. Mugler v.
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tions on land use. As the Supreme Court recognized long ago, the just com-
pensation clause was designed to bar the government from forcing a limited
number of citizens to bear the cost of public benefits which in fairness should
be paid for by society.3 57 The Court has stated that, even if a particular cost
was not foreseen by the government, "it is fairer to allocate any resulting fi-
nancial loss to the inevitable costs of government borne by all the taxpayers,
than to allow its impact to be felt solely by those whose rights ... have been
violated."3 58 The First English majority confirmed this concept when it af-
firmed that "[i]t is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment's just compensation
provision is 'designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.' ,,159
The idea that property and liberty are intertwined is a fundamental con-
cept of the Constitution. The language of the fifth amendment links property
rights with some of the most cherished protections of individual liberty.300 The
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Pro-regulation commentators and courts have tried to
extend this concept to cover the effect of all land-use regulations no matter how confis-
catory. As California Supreme Court Justice Clark observed in dissent in Agins I, the
holding in that case "effectively pronounces that henceforth in California title to real
property will no longer be held in fee simple but rather in trust for whatever purposes
and uses a governmental agency exercising legislative power elects, without compensa-
tion." Agins 1, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 282, 598 P.2d 25, 34, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 381 (1979)
(Clark, J., dissenting). Clark also noted that the plain objective of the regulation at
issue in Agins I was to take property for public use. As he put it, "What greater dimi-
nution can there be than where, as here, [the government] has admitted that the ordi-
nance complained of 'has completely destroyed the value of Plaintiff's property for any
purpose or use whatsoever?'" Id. at 279, 598 P.2d at 32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 379. As
Justice Clark predicted, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Agins I view,
after a long delay, in First English.
357. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
358. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655 (1980).
359. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. at 2388 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
360. The fifth amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital ... crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment... ; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. As one treatise observes, "There can be little doubt that the
framers believed that protection of property rights was an essential part of the Ameri-
can system." B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1977).
Recognition that this concept embraced regulatory takings was one of the most
important and influential features of Justice Brennan's opinion in San Diego Gas. As a
study of that opinion found, this recognition "transform[ed] two dimensional argu-
ments setting property rights against government regulations into a three dimensional
essay on official accountability in a liberal democracy, in which American courts' pri-
mary responsibility in all cases should be the protection of individual freedoms."
Bauman, supra note 31, at 95. As two other commentators noted, this recognition has
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Supreme Court has recognized that property rights are among the most im-
portant of the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and declared
that they are not somehow inferior to other civil rights supposedly more per-
sonal. In the words of Justice Stewart:
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property
without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to
travel, is in truth a "personal" right .... In fact, a fundamental interdepen-
dence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right to
property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in prop-
erty are basic civil rights has long been recognized. 31
The First English Court affirmed that constitutional rights are paramount
in the context of property as well as in other areas.362 In doing so, it gave a
definitive answer to the question of whether policy considerations should tip
the scales against a compensation remedy for regulatory takings.36 3 Such pol-
icy arguments, the First English Court said, are unavailing in light of the
"command" of the just compensation clause.3 " First English thus joins Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha6 5 and Bowsher v. Synar3 66 as a
notable recent example of the Court's willingness to defend the Constitution
even where policy and expediency may be inconvenienced, and where major
pragmatic difficulties for the government may result.
In summing up its decision, the First English Court proclaimed the
supremacy of the Constitution in the regulatory takings context. As the Court
put it:
We realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen to some ex-
tent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing bodies of
municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations. But such conse-
quences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a claim of constitutional
right: many of the provisions of the Constitution are designed to limit the
flexibility and freedom of governmental authorities and the Just Compensa-
tion Clause is one of them.3"7
sometimes been lacking among liberals. Brennan "took a hard look at the guarantees in
the Bill of Rights and acknowledges - as some 'liberals' have had a difficult time
doing - that property rights are protected by the Constitution in the same breath with
rights of life and liberty, and all deserve judicial protection." Berger & Kanner,
Thoughts on "The White River Junction Manifesto". A Reply to the "Gang of
Fives's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 LOV.
L.A.L. REv. 685, 719 (1986).
361. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
362. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
363. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
364. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2387.
365. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidation of the legislative veto).
366. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986) (role for Comptroller General in enforcement of
Gramm-Rudman Act violated separation of powers).
367. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389. Wielding the Constitution to protect indi-
vidual rights against excessive government encroachment is the noblest function of the
Supreme Court. In that sense, First English may deserve a place among the Court's
finest moments in recent years.
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V. CONCLUSION
Prior to First English, each of the fundamental questions regarding regu-
latory takings lacked a definitive answer. No one could say for certain whether
the effect of a land use regulation could amount to a "taking" of property, or
if compensation was the remedy if such a taking occurred. No one could state
conclusively when a compensable regulatory taking began, or whether the end-
ing of such a taking precluded compensation. The resulting uncertainty was
bad for both regulators and landowners.
The Court's ruling in First English has substantially reduced this uncer-
tainty. Its holding has established that the Constitution requires compensation
when a regulation takes property, even when such a taking is ended by rescis-
sion or amendment of the regulation. The opinion has also suggested the pa-
rameters of a test for pinpointing when a regulatory taking begins, and
strongly implied that a regulation valid as regards the police power can never-
theless constitute a taking if it deprives the owner of the use of the property.
Although the First English opinion has not eliminated all grounds for dispute
on these latter questions, it has provided partial answers and suggested the
shape of the conclusions likely to be reached in future cases.
The First English decision did not signal the tilt toward property owners
painted in popular reports. Considerable procedural requirements must still be
met before a landowner aggrieved by a regulation can bring an inverse con-
demnation action, and several safety nets still separate regulators from ulti-
mate financial liability. What the decision did accomplish may be best de-
scribed as a leveling of the playing field on which regulators and landowners
contend. While compensation was unavailable when regulations took away the
use of property, landowners were at a fundamental disadvantage in attempting
to protect their constitutionally guaranteed property rights. Regulators faced
no real penalty for trampling on those rights, and behaved accordingly. By
establishing that the Constitution requires compensation for regulatory tak-
ings, the First English Court has ended the law's previous tilt toward
regulators.
The First English ruling has also insured an ultimate protection for indi-
vidual property rights against violation by the government through regulations.
That revitalization of constitutional guarantees is the most fundamental mean-
ing of the case. First English stands as a reminder that even ends which bene-
fit society do not justify means forbidden by the Constitution as unfair to indi-
viduals. Its reaffirmation of the mutually dependent relationship between
liberty and property which lies at the heart of the just compensation clause of
the fifth amendment may in the end prove to be its most significant message.
WM. DAVID TAYLOR III
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